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The following thesis portfolio addresses the overarching research question of 
“How should U.S. foreign policy be implemented?” To answer this question, the thesis 
examines three areas of study: (1) how policy is sold, (2) how it should be crafted, and 
(3) finally, how it could be implemented.  
Chapter one examines how U.S. presidents sell foreign policy to the American 
public, focusing on the tool that religion and religious speech play in the process. While a 
powerful political force, the chapter sought to determine how religion can drive policy. 
Examining presidential speeches and decisions pertaining to foreign policy in two case 
studies, the research determined that religion can play a number of roles in any given 
presidency, and that it can be used to secure political capital for momentous policy 
initiatives or significant shifts in policy.  
Chapter two asked “What should be the fundamental/theoretical underpinnings of 
American foreign policy?” This chapter addressed this question in the hope of learning 
what core considerations should always be contemplated when devising policy. After 
analyzing various geopolitical theories, we set out how to describe the utility 
conservative geopolitical thought brings to current foreign policy issues and why certain 
hard-truths to include culture, geography and history must always be consulted in 
formulating policy.  
Chapter three was dedicated to completing the foreign policy process, exploring 
the topic of application or implementation. Having explored how policy can be sold and 
how it should be crafted, it was natural to examine how it would successfully be put into 




component required to successfully implement U.S. foreign policy and then construct a 
prospective policy to demonstrate implementation of a policy aimed at preserving a vital 
national interest. To demonstrate this, a threat analysis was conducted on the possibility 
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Portfolio Introduction:  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled with implementing 
foreign policy.  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall on November 9, 1989, the United States virtually overnight found itself alone as the 
world’s sole superpower.  Alone at the top, with no obvious threats – such as another 
ideologically-opposed superpower anywhere on the immediate horizon – policymakers in 
both parties failed to collectively define American national interests. Indeed, the great 
tragedy was that we failed to capitalize on a unique opportunity in which we could 
shepherd in an era of global prosperity and peace and bring a number of estranged 
countries into the fold. One of the rarest occurrences in world history – a period of 
benevolent sole hegemony – passed us by. To be fair, the task facing our nation’s 
policymakers was a massive undertaking; the collapse of our greatest foe and the 
immediate need for a new national policy no doubt shocked the core of those whose life’s 
work had been dismantling and defeating the communist threat. With the disappearance 
of the threat that in many ways defined their professional and personal lives, the sense of 
urgency to find a new cause was surely significant.  
The temptation to energetically engage – especially in a national cause – should 
always be preceded by careful and thoughtful analysis, as well as a clear and concise 
understanding of what one seeks of affect and a realistic determination of whether or not 
the instruments of national power can achieve the desired end. And yet the period of time 




The absence of a readily-identifiable threat resulted in what Walter Russell Mead 
calls America’s “lost years.”
1
  This period of time, roughly spanning from late-1989 to 
September 11, 2001 – represented a period of strategic inaction. By failing to look long-
term and form unified consensus on (1) what intrinsic American interests were, (2) what 
constituted potential rising threats, and (3) work through a deliberate calculus predicated 
on strategic thought and a strong sense of history, administrators of American foreign 
policy failed to utilize the preponderance of political capital and influence that the United 
States had accrued by winning the ideological struggle against totalitarianism that 
personified the twentieth century.  
We would argue that a combination of failures of varying levels of importance to 
the foreign policy formulation process have occurred and have led us to the poor 
execution of foreign policy initiatives proposed by successive presidential 
administrations dating back to the end of the Cold War. These failures include the 
aforementioned inability to seize the initiative following the fall of the Soviet Union, a 
lack of strategic vision regarding America’s role in the world and a fundamental 
disconnect between theories of foreign policy and achievable outcomes.   
The “end of history” and the break out of peace all over the world described by 
Francis Fukuyama as he observed the imminent fall of the Soviet Union
2
 and the sense 
that something very profound had occurred was not misplaced or incorrect. Rather, it was 
incomplete in that so many involved in the policy process perceived a period of 
relaxation, where investment and attention to foreign matters could be minimized and 
                                               
1 Mead, Walter Russell. Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy In a World At Risk. 
New York: Knopf, 2004, 5. 





resources diverted towards enlarging and expanding domestic and non-defense programs. 
This period of relaxation can best be attributed to the belief that a “particular period of 
postwar history” was passing by, leading to a point marking “mankind’s ideological 




This of course was incredibly misplaced and ran counter to a millennia of world 
history. To expect all of mankind to accept “Western liberal democracy” was to ignore 
realities such as history, societal norms and traditions of cultures far different from our 
own. An appreciation of history can tell us that some cultures are incompatible with 
American-style government. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the attempts at 
nation-building that took place following the invasion phases provide clear evidence of 
this and illustrate a significant part of the problem; which is that we as a nation have set 
unrealistic goals regarding what we can accomplish – particularly regarding the use of 
military forces. The misplaced belief in “liberal-style democracy for all” has mired us 
down in wars without end because we fail to account for the realities of the conflict and 
because we fail to properly align concrete objectives with attainable goals. In essence, we 
fail to account for the factors critical to the implementation of sustainable policy.        
One can draw a relatively straight line from the ill-conceived conclusion 
regarding the “universalization of Western liberal democracy” clung to towards the end 
of the twentieth century and the “messianic dimension” of U.S. foreign policy that has 
largely personified U.S. national policy over roughly the last two decades. Defined as the 
belief that American society is the best possible society and therefore should be emulated 
                                               






 it is apparent that it is drawn from Fukuyama’s notion of having 
arrived at the end of history.    
By failing to craft a new foreign policy that would maximize the preponderance 
of U.S. power and goodwill and instead cling to a poorly constructed theory, America 
stumbled out of the gate at the start of the twenty-first century. American foreign policy 
was further doomed by the fact that once the operating theory was identified as flawed, 
no one went back to the drawing board to rework a feasible plan of application or 
implementation.     
To  “fix” American foreign policy, it is best to form a framework by which the 
foreign policy process can be understood; while also learning what foreign policy should 
be aimed at accomplishing; which of course is tethered to a fundamental and realistic 
understanding of the limits of national power.      
We would argue that the problems associated with implementation generally flow 
from a failure to formulate. Formulation of course is contingent on a multitude of factors, 
chief among which is a realistic understanding of what the instruments of American 
national power can and can’t do, what basic or vital national interests are, and 
acknowledgment of the fixed hard-truths that the policy must contend with.   
This work is an attempt to form a framework for implementing American foreign 
policy. This framework is built around three critical areas consisting of selling, crafting 
and implementing policy. A chapter is dedicated to each of these areas, with the intent of 
clearly articulating the important considerations pertaining to each step of the foreign 
policy process with the overall goal of improving the implementation process. It is our 
belief that if a deep appreciation of the core considerations are attained, then the 
                                               




foundation can be set for building a more sustainable foreign policy that will invariably 
be capable of securing vital American interests.          
In chapter one, we examine how presidents sell foreign policy agendas to the 
American public, looking specifically at religion and how it has been used as a tool by 
American presidents to accumulate political capital in order to execute significant foreign 
policy agendas. Religion has been a powerful force throughout world history, and to this 
day is used as both a battle cry and as a call for peace. The intense power religion 
possesses and the influence it can exert over individuals – particularly as it pertains to 
securing public support for prospective policies – necessitates that its role is examined.  
Religion has had a significant impact on the implementation of U.S. foreign 
policy. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan are used as case studies, as both 
were found to be representative of major political parties, and both were found to provide 
religion with various roles within their administrations – even within one policy – which 
makes plain to the reader the importance it holds in the selling portion of the 
implementation process.    
In chapter two, we examine what the underpinnings of American foreign policy 
should consist of in order to generate sustained success and the achievement of national 
objectives abroad. Chapter two explores what the formula for generating U.S. foreign 
policy should be, and by examining the scholarly record, we argue for the inclusion of 
conservative geopolitical thought and the principles it is predicated upon. Research 
suggested that this is the best school of thought to pursue, since it accounts for 
inescapable realities (“hard truths”), and directs limited national resources towards 




interest at stake). Emphasizing geography, resource allocation for national production and 
sustainment, the maintenance of military forces in conjunction with national objectives so 
that vital interests are secured, conservative geopolitics stresses the uncompromising 
nature of the trinity of culture, geography and history and the need for assessments 
developed with these considerations in mind.  
While globalization has integrated the world, we are still a world of nations with 
national agendas, and these national agendas often run counter to the agendas held by 
international organizations. With this paramount consideration in mind, a foreign policy 
rooted in conservative geopolitical thought should be pursued by the United States. Of 
the other schools examined – internationalism, multilateral institutionalism, 
neoconservatism, progressive geopolitics – conservative geopolitics allows the U.S. to 
maintain its sovereignty and allocate resources towards areas of strategic need.  As we 
have been reminded recently, even a prosperous nation like the U.S. must be judicious 
with her resources – as no nation’s resources are finite.  
Finally, chapter three, sets forth to determine what the most critical component is 
in the implementation step of applying American foreign policy (the chief executive) and 
then seeks to ascertain what qualities the president should possess if wishing to establish 
a sustainable and successful foreign policy. With this knowledge, we construct a formula 
by which policy can be generated, and examines the threat Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terror poses to the American homeland to demonstrate 
how the formula would work. 
The defense of the American homeland from a CBRN terror attack was chosen to 




chosen with the preceding chapters in mind. First, CBRN weapons have been touted by 
national security professionals to be the top threat facing the U.S.; a “catastrophic attack 
on the U.S. homeland” and “proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction” 
were highlighted and prioritized as “top strategic risks” in the 2015 National Security 
Strategy (NSS).
5
 The Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council 
staff has stated the threat of nuclear weapons are as grave as any threat facing us, as is the 
potential use of these weapons by non-state actors and terrorist organizations
6
 – 
observations reiterated in the 2015 NSS.
7
 Experts from academia also recognize grand 
terror attacks, particularly CBRN-types, to be the greatest threat to the American 
homeland
8
 and that “given the mentality of many terrorists…and the relative ease with 
which chemical, radiological and biological weapons can be created, it is highly likely 
that several, perhaps many WMD attacks…will occur.”
9
 
With these considerations in mind, as well as those explored at greater detail in 
chapter two, devising a framework for crafting and implementing a policy aimed at 
defending against a CBRN terror attack is in accord with a foreign policy rooted in 
conservative geopolitics, thereby complementing chapter two. 
Second, defense against CBRN-related terror attacks considers the element of 
religion; as it serves as the link between some of the most violent Islamic terrorist 
organizations and the pursuit of CBRN-type weapons. 
                                               
5 White House. National Security Strategy. 2015, 2. 
6
 Thomas, Troy. Lecture. 2015 National Security Strategy: Process, Principles, and Priorities. Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab. 27 April. 2015. Lecture. 
7 White House. National Security Strategy, 11. 
8 Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003, 47. 
9 Walton, C. Dale, Grand Strategy and the Presidency: Foreign Policy, War and the American Role In the 




Take the Islamic State for example. An organization that has threatened direct 
confrontation with the U.S.
10
, the Islamic State is also dedicated to pursing an extremely 
violent and brutal ideology ultimately concerned with bring on the apocalypse.
11
 The 
organization’s strategy is dictated by this mission, and it strongly suggests that they 
would be interested in pursuing weapons of mass destruction or mass casualty. According 
to Will McCants at Brookings, members of the Islamic State “believe that the final 
apocalyptic battles with the infidel are swiftly approaching,”
12
 further suggesting that the 
threat this group and other like-minded organizations intent on the wholly-destructive 
targeting of infidels – nonbelievers, non-Muslims and those associated with Western 
influence –are serious about the use of awesomely destructive weapons. 
When considered with the general proliferation of dual-use technology, increased 
access to technological knowledge required to build improvised devices and weapons, 
and the growing access to precursors required to build them (the World Nuclear 
Association, for example reported in April 2015 that a significant surplus of enriched 
uranium exists worldwide
13
), terrorist pursuit of CBRN weapons is a top threat to the 
U.S.           
The overarching topic of U.S. foreign policy that spans the thesis portfolio and the 
subtopics explored in each chapter: religion, theories of geopolitics, and U.S foreign 
policy implementation regarding the threat of CBRN-related terror, are massive topics in 
their own right, and it was not our intent to address every possible variable pertaining to 
                                               
10 “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),” Counter Terrorism Guide, national Counterterrorism 
Center, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqi_isil.html (May 3, 2015). 
11
 Beauchamp, Zach, “ISIS is really obsessed with the apocalypse,” Vox, April 6, 2015, 
http://www.vox.com/2015/4/6/8341691/isis-apocalypse (May 3, 2015). 
12 Ibid.  
13 “Uranium Enrichment,” World Nuclear Association, last updated April 2015, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment/ (May 3, 




each area of study. One could easily dedicate their entire life to the study of any one topic 
examined within this portfolio – and indeed some have. The general goal of this portfolio 
was to link together what we saw as three important considerations that should be thought 
of when administering U.S. foreign policy. Having identified each specific topic as 
important and relevant to the application of U.S. foreign policy generally and to U.S. 
national security specifically, we sought to determine how each interfaced in the 
implementation of foreign policy so that a framework could be built in the hope that what 
should be core considerations are reintroduced to the administering of American foreign 
policy.         
Lastly, this thesis portfolio does not pretend to suggest how to fix something as 
complex and large as U.S. foreign policy. What we hope is that this thesis portfolio will 
breathe life into what we consider a few important topics that seem to have been 
forgotten or at the minimum, need to be relearned. We hope that this work will contribute 
to a healthy national discussion of how U.S .foreign policy should be implemented – 













Religion in Monumental U.S. Foreign Policy 
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The President of the United States is in essence America’s top decision maker; 
throughout our nation’s history, the Commander in Chief has been primarily tasked with 
making choices on behalf of the nation.  I would define decision making here as the 
process of making an informed choice among a variety of alternatives.  Strategic decision 
making, the type expected from the president, is no different, especially with regard to 
foreign policy; although there are a few other critical factors that must be considered 
when one is analyzing the president’s selection of a choice among a variety of 
alternatives.  These factors include: 1) that the choice selected or the decision made by 
the president is often made without complete information and 2) that the president’s own 
life experiences, values and spiritual beliefs – or, in a word, religion (or lack thereof) – 
have the potential of impacting the outcome. It is usually a given that many of the hard 
choices that the president must make regarding foreign policy will be made with 
incomplete information; over the course of the 20
th
 century, national intelligence and 
collection agencies have been created with the stated hope of addressing this first factor.  
Similar efforts are still being made today; one such example is the National Security 
Agency’s electronic telecommunications data collection efforts.  The second factor is 
more difficult to address because it is inherently abstract and contains a greater amount of 
variance.   
Some U.S. presidents have been deeply religious people and did not make that a 
secret during their time in office.  Historical analysis of this group has revealed that their 
personal beliefs or faith profoundly affected their political agendas.  There is little debate 




“Religion has always been a major force in U.S. politics, policy, identity, and 
culture. Religion shapes the nation's character, helps form Americans' ideas 
about the world, and influences the ways Americans respond to events beyond 
their borders. Religion explains both Americans' sense of themselves as a chosen 
people and their belief that they have a duty to spread their values throughout 
the world. Of course, not all Americans believe such things -- and those who do 
often bitterly disagree over exactly what they mean. But enough believe them 




Others have declined to identify with one particular religion and have opted not to 
make religion or personal religious belief the mainstay of their political agenda.  Yet 
religion, regardless of the role afforded to it by the president, perennially plays a factor in 
the setting of the president’s foreign policy agenda, which raises the question; if religion 
can play many roles in a president’s foreign policy agenda, how are the roles selected and 
do executives deploy a religious response when confronted with specific foreign policy 
issues?  
This essay will explore the various roles that religion has held in an effort to 
examine how religion has been deployed in promoting foreign policy agendas.  By 
determining how religion has been used by past presidents, I hope to identify specific 
foreign policy issues or dilemmas that typically yield a religious response.  Taking the 
general consensus that religion does have a role in foreign policy setting a step further, 
what follows will include an analysis of how religion is implemented, identification and 
analysis of foreign policy agendas that produced a religious response from the president 
                                               




and finally a discussion of what the selected case studies tell us about the use of religious 
responses in U.S. presidencies generally.  This essay’s sole focus on foreign policy is due 
to the fact that the president usually holds more unilateral discretion over the direction of 
foreign policy (at least more so than other areas of presidential purview).  The realm of 
foreign policy was also chosen because of the security component that it encompasses; 
national security policy has direct correlation to foreign policy.  Finally, limiting this 
analysis to foreign policy will allow for a specific and useful study.     
Literature Review  
Roles of Religion in Presidential Decision Making 
Reviewing scholarly literature and academic studies concerning the role of 
religion in the setting of the president’s foreign policy agenda, there arise several schools 
of thought.  Through a review of the relevant literature, I have determined that these 
groups include those who propose: (1) that religion serves a traditional role, guiding the 
president’s individual or personal decision making, (2) that religion is implemented by 
the president as a political tool used to garnish public support for a specific policy or set 
of policies, (3) that religion is employed by the president to secure peaceful dialogue 
among hostile or warring parties, (4) that religion is used to divide groups and even 
generate, renew or increase hostilities.            
Religion in a Traditional Role 
The concept of religion serving a traditional role, guiding the president’s 
individual or personal decision making with regard to large foreign policy questions, is 




that religion can play in foreign policy decision making.  There have been many scholars 
who have suggested that religion has primarily impacted foreign policy in this manner.     
Throughout the history of the U.S., there have been Chief Executives who 
considered themselves religious in this traditional sense and believed that there was a role 
for religion in foreign policy.  While men such as George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson, men of the founding, may or may not have subscribed to a specific religion 
(there is debate regarding this); they believed strongly in God’s Providence and believed 
that America would serve as a beacon of morality for the rest of the world.
15
  Writing in 
The Review of Faith & International Affairs, Dennis R. Hoover, the journal’s Editor, cites 
his colleague William B. Allen, writing that George Washington believed firmly that for 
a republican form of government to flourish, a “virtuous character grounded in religion”
16
 
would need to take root in America.  Citing examples which include Washington’s 1783 
“Circular Address to the Governors of the Thirteen States,” 1793 “Proclamation of 
Neutrality,” and his 1796 “Farwell Address,” Hoover contends that Allen is asserting that 
Washington’s political thought and foreign policy decisions were shaped by religious 
thought.
17
   
Frank Lambert, another colleague of Hoover, states that Thomas Jefferson 
maintained a belief that America would serve as a “moral beacon in an immoral world”
18
 
and would be an exceptional nation whose actions were founded in principle.
19
  While 
these presidents presided over the earliest chapter of America, there continue to be 
                                               
15
 Hoover, Dennis R. “Religion and the Presidents: An Introduction to the Winter 2011 Issue.” The Review 
of Faith and International Affairs. December 2011, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1-2. 
16 Ibid, 1-2. 
17 Ibid, 1-2. 
18 Ibid, 1-2. 




executives who give this role to religion.  And while these great men lived during the 
founding of America, their view of religion and its role in foreign policy are still present 
in the modern era.  Most notably in the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and George W. 
Bush. 
Writing about the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush, D. Jason 
Berggren and Nicol C. Rae argue that personal evangelical-type faiths play a large role in 
the directives mandated by U.S. presidents who subscribe to that type of belief.
20
  
Berggren and Rae categorize Carter and Bush as politicians “of a very different 
deposition,” suggesting that these men were elected by the American public because they 
were political amateurs and considered “men of faith.”
21
  In essence, the authors argue 
that the personal religious beliefs held by these men were prominent factors in their rise 
to office and later in guiding their foreign policy decisions.  The authors suggest that 
political circumstances arise in the United States from time to time, which prompt the 
public to elect this type of leader; believing their qualities are what is necessary to 
address the country’s ailments.
22
  History provides strong support for this argument, as 
Jimmy Carter was elected following the demonization of President Nixon for his part in 
the Watergate Scandal and George W. Bush was elected after President Clinton’s affair 
with Monica Lewinski was exposed.  Indeed, each of these men has come to embody a 
specific brand of foreign policy: Carter and humanitarian/human-rights based-initiatives; 
Bush and the aptly named Bush Doctrine; each stemming from their personally held 
faiths.  It should be noted that these two presidents had differing personalities, political 
                                               
20 Berggren D. Jason and Rae, Nicol C. “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an 
Evangelical Presidential Style.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. December 2006, Vol. 36, No. 4, 606-607. 
21 Ibid, 608. 




views and policy inclinations; yet both ended up advancing a similar foreign policy 
agenda.  Personally maintained religious beliefs lead executives to focus on what the 
authors refer to as nonmaterial capabilities; which are those that other than the obvious 
foreign policy tools such as military force and economic superiority.
23
  Berggren and Rae 
offer that morality takes precedent over these aforementioned capabilities in foreign 
policy decision making when the president is one who draws from his faith.                  
Religion as a Political Tool 
While the previous section discussed the idea of religion in the traditional sense as 
a guiding force employed by various presidents in an effort to guide their decision 
making, there also exist instances where religion has been implemented as a purely 
political tool.  When considering the potential roles for religion in the development of 
foreign policy, this is likely to be another more obvious role that it often identified.  Like 
religion as a traditional tool, there exist a few broad conceptual theories regarding the 
role of religion as a political tool. 
Paul F. Boller, Jr. provides a historical account of religion and its role in U.S. 
presidencies.  While his article primarily focuses on classifying presidents into five 
primary categories: 1) Born-Again; 2) Churchgoers when assuming office; 3) 
Churchgoers once attaining office; 4) Churchgoers after leaving office; and 5) Presidents 
who were never churchgoers, his work provides valuable insight into the role religion has 
held within the presidency.  Boller states that twenty-one presidents were church 
members upon entering the White House,
24
 suggesting that these men implemented 
religion in the “traditional” sense referenced above.  He focuses on two particular 
                                               
23 Ibid, 617. 





presidents when examining men who became churchgoers once becoming president; 
Calvin Coolidge and Dwight D. Eisenhower.  His categorizing of these men as examples 
of presidents taking up religion upon assuming office suggests that these men had a 
political realization regarding religion; or to put it another way, they saw a that religion 
could be a useful political tool, capable of allowing them to connect with their 
constituents.                  
T. Jeremy Gunn and Mounia Slighoua explore religion as a political tool in 
foreign policy by examining the presidency of Eisenhower, furthering Boller’s suggestion 
that Eisenhower was among those chiefly employing religion as a political tool.  In their 
essay “The Spiritual Factor: Eisenhower, Religion and Foreign Policy” Gunn and 
Slighoua agree with Boller that Eisenhower did not subscribe to a religion, writing that in 
1952, prior to his run for president, Eisenhower revealed to Billy Graham (the famous 
preacher) that he was not a subscriber to any religion, that he had never been baptized 
and that he rarely ever attended any organized religious services.
25
  The authors suggest 
that Eisenhower recognized two tremendous benefits that religion – particularly 
Christianity – provided and they submit that these two benefits were recognized by 
subsequent administrations throughout the remainder of the Cold War.   
The first of these is that religion, particularly the morals, values and general 
lifestyle it promoted, was beneficial for the direction of the nation as a whole.  Gunn and 
Slighoua write that while campaigning for president, Eisenhower repeatedly stated that 
fundamental religious values were crucial for a democracy to function properly
26
 and 
after taking office did much to advance universal adoption of Christian values.  Gunn and 
                                               
25 Gunn, T. Jeremy and Slighoua, Mounia. “The Spiritual Factor: Eisenhower, Religion and Foreign 
Policy.” The Review of Faith and International Affairs. December 2011, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 40.  




Slighoua state that within two weeks of his inauguration, Eisenhower was baptized into 
the Presbyterian Church
27
 and followed that up by holding the first ever “Presidential 
Prayer Breakfast,” now known as the National Prayer Breakfast
28
.   Eisenhower’s actions 
to promote religion as chronicled by Gunn and Slighoua are in line with previous 
administrations,
29
 as they also saw the social value that religion provided to the American 
public.  It is however, the second benefit that Eisenhower saw for religion that holds the 
most relevance when contemplating religion as a political tool used to effectively 
implement the president’s foreign policy agenda.  The authors write that Eisenhower 
realized that religion could have a binding effect and had the potential to unite the 
American people around his aggressive policies regarding communism.
30
  Throughout 
the remainder of the Cold War, subsequent presidents continued to use religion, 
specifically Christianity, as a rallying cry against the evils of communism.  This would be 
readily apparent in the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan.   
Religion as a Peaceful Tool 
There are other, less publicized ways that religion can be implemented as a 
foreign policy tool, particularly by presidents searching for a peaceful outcome to 
hostilities.  Writing in a Special Report published for the United States Institute of Peace, 
David Smock contemplates the role of religion in world affairs, particularly its role in 
times of conflict and in times of peace.
31
  Taking a different approach to religion, Smock 
argues that religion’s ability to promote peace and reconciliation is often overlooked, 
                                               
27 Ibid, 41.  
28 Ibid, 41.  
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 Hoover, Dennis R. “Religion and the Presidents: An Introduction to the Winter 2011 Issue.” The Review 
of Faith and International Affairs. December 2011, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1-2. 
30 Gunn, T. Jeremy and Slighoua, Mounia. “The Spiritual Factor: Eisenhower, Religion and Foreign 
Policy.” The Review of Faith and International Affairs. December 2011, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 40. 
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especially by religious leaders, political leaders and institutions that can serve as 
mediators in a conflict.
32
  While Smock states that it is “regrettable that the U.S. 
government is so ill equipped to handle religious issues and relate to religious actors,”
33
 I 
hesitate to place U.S. presidents in this camp, as two strong examples from the late 20
th
 
century readily come to mind; President Carter’s role in negotiating the peace treaty 
between Israel’s Menachem Begin and Egypt’s Anwar El-Sadat
34
 and President Reagan’s 
partnering with Pope John Paul II to undermine communism in Eastern Europe.  All 
parties to the Israeli Egyptian Peace Treaty were of different faiths, yet all three men 
were able to find mutual ground by the end of the peace process because a permanent 
peace appealed to all three religions, as well as the constituents they represented.  
Likewise, while President Reagan was not a Catholic, his own religious beliefs were 
consistent with those held by Pope John Paul II regarding communism.
35
  Specifically, 
both men agreed that communism was a moral evil and that victory was the only answer 
to the threat of communism – accommodation was not possible.
36
  In each of these 
examples, the president did not share the same religious ideology that his counterparts 
held; however, both Carter and Reagan were able to identify shared, core principles that 
all participating faiths valued.   
Smock also argues that it is imperative that religion not be underestimated for its 
peacemaking ability and that focus shift from what he argues as an overemphasis on 
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religion as a source of conflict to religion as a force for peace.
37
  Citing the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, Smock acknowledges that it is easy to place oneself in the religion as a driver of 
conflict camp,
38
 but proposes instead that individuals strive to take a holistic view and 
look to history for examples of times when religion has led to the successful conclusion 
of hostilities and the outset of peace.  Smock is not alone in arguing for the importance of 
religion as a tool for peace.  Writing in the journal Peace & Dialogue, Lilian Curaming 
states that religion is an extremely powerful force in society and that religious traditions 
are made up of valuable elements that have the potential to “promote mutual friendship 
and respect among peoples.”
39
  Curaming writes that since its inception or beginning, 
religion has generated growth and communion rather than drive alienation and conflict 
among people.
40
  She argues that for these reasons, religion is a useful tool in promoting 
peace on the international state-to-state level.   
Religion as a Tool for War 
While the concept of religion as a tool for war has arguably been in existence 
since the formation of organized religion, the subject has received greater scholarly 
attention since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Writing in the Journal of Peace Research, 
Peter S. Henne states that interstate disputes or conflicts regarding religion have 
increased since the fall of communism, as the world transformed from a bipolar world to 
a multipolar one.
41
  With communism no longer taking center stage with regard to 
international affairs, the focus has shifted to confrontations among secular states and 
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 which he argues is problematic because religious regimes feel a 
heightened perception of threat when confronted and are unwilling to relent or 
compromise in fear of losing legitimacy.
43
  What Henne seeks to impart upon the reader 
is that religion has become a war cry since the fall of communism and has arguably 
resulted in the conflicts of the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
A similar notion is advanced by David G. Kibble in his 2002 essay, “The Attacks 
of 9/11: Evidence of a Clash of Religions?”  In his essay, Kibble writes that while 
President Bush believed that he was not fighting a religious war, he was in actuality 
doing just that – without knowing it.
44
  The perception that President Bush launched a 
religious war in declaring the war on terror is also often linked to the Bush Doctrine, the 
former president’s foreign policy agenda.  While the Bush Doctrine has been subject to 
much scrutiny and has been described in a variety of ways, it has notably been labeled 
“democratic realism,” “national security liberalism,” “democratic globalism” and 
“messianic universalism,”
45
 the last of which suggests a Christian undertone or theme.  
What Andrew Fiala is referencing appears to be identical to what Kibble is suggesting in 
his essay: That President Bush’s declaration of the war on terror signaled the dawn of the 
Bush Doctrine; a set of policies aimed at eliminating terrorists though all available U.S. 
means and the establishment of democratic institutions founded upon Christian principles 
not unlike those maintained in the U.S.               
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Though some subtle differences exist, there is considerable overlap here, as the 
implementation of religion as a tool for war in the realm of foreign policy contains many 
of the similarities and characteristics as religion implemented as a political tool.  In 
essence, the difference primarily exists in the context in which the mandate or decision is 
made.     
Religion in Promoting Monumental Policy  
To this point, the various roles that religion can play in foreign policy decision 
making have been introduced and discussed, and examples have been given in order to 
illustrate for the reader how these roles have been applied in reality, not simply just in 
theory.  Thorough discussion of these roles begs the following questions: (1) Why should 
we expect religion to play a role in the promotion of foreign policy? and (2) Is it 
surprising that religion is often given such credence in a secular nation?    
The answer to the first question is that we should expect religion to play a role in 
the promotion of foreign policy agendas when they are monumental in nature.  By 
monumental I mean policies or agendas aimed at exacting or producing an intentional 
change or shift in policy through direct or indirect American intervention.  Religion is a 
powerful force, and politicians have found that religion is a persuasive tool, useful in not 
only binding the public together behind an initiative, but also useful in securing a high 
degree of credibility – credibility which allows executives to pursue aggressive policies 
which they otherwise would not be able to pursue.  This is especially attractive to 
politicians as credibility is the highest form of political currency. 
Michelle Gonzalez discusses this in her essay “Religion and the U.S. Presidency: 




come to categorize the political action described above as “theolegal democracy,” which 
is a rapprochement that takes place when theology transforms into a political 
commodity.
46
  Gonzalez is essentially suggesting that if religion is harnessed under the 
correct circumstances, it can be converted into a form of political currency that a 
politician is then able to spend with little resistance or significant blowback from the 
American people.  Gonzalez elaborates further, stating that “…religion can be used to 
manipulate and change perceptions about how the United States acts as a nation” and that 
“…religion can come dangerously close to as embodying God’s will.”
47
   
To put it succinctly, it essentially provides the president with a blank check with 
which to finance his foreign policy plans.  If the president is able to sell the American 
public on a particular foreign policy on religious grounds – suggesting that his proposed 
plan is close to “God’s will” or at least a very well intentioned policy and will produce 
results that everyone will like – he has in essence accumulated the credibility needed to 
see his policy implemented and realized.  Therefore (to answer the second question) it 
should not be surprising that religion – when converted into political currency – is often 
used to sell monumental foreign policy initiatives to the American public.      
This of course, is not how everyone feels, as there are those who would expect 
religion to play absolutely no role in the promotion of foreign policy initiatives.  The 
obvious counter argument is that religion is not the unifying force that others have 
portrayed it as; it is instead a divisive element that has the ability to drive people and 
groups apart because it is ultimately a matter of personal preference.  Furthermore, as a 
matter of personal preference, religion often becomes a sensitive issue with people which 
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lead many to strongly believe that religion has no place in the public arena.  Many in this 
camp would also point out that the U.S. is a secular nation, and demand a strict 
“separation of church and state” interpretation of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, disregarding the fact that the Founding Fathers saw as religion as a force for 
good and essential to the success of the U.S.
48
   
Received Knowledge 
Why Are Religious Roles Selected?  
A review of a sampling of the vast amounts of scholarly work dedicated to the 
subject has revealed that the role of religion in foreign policy has been studied to a 
considerable extent, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Scholars along the 
academic and political spectrum have contributed sound analysis which has effectively 
distinguished the various roles that religion can be afforded by a U.S. president when he 
is attempting to generate support for his policy preferences.  With regard to foreign 
policy, we have learned that religion has great range.  Depending on preference, the 
president can tap into his personal beliefs, choose religion for the sake of political 
expediency, or provide religion with a platform for its ability to either incite or garner 
support.   
 However, in my opinion, there exists a general deficiency in the examination of 
why these religious roles are selected.  The cataloging of roles and their examination in 
the literature review was necessary so that we can begin to discover why roles are 
selected.  In order to determine why roles are selected, we first had to gain an 
understanding of what the major roles that religion can be afforded are.  Having 
identified the major roles, we can now start the process of determining why roles are 
                                               




selected; with specific attention paid to foreign policy initiatives.  In order to accomplish 
this, we need only look to the past; specifically, to the historical context within which the 
then-president attempted to influence (foreign) policy.  By examining the historical 
period – to include a variety of influences, such as upbringing, exposure to religion(s), 
social movements and political climate – we can infer why religion was provided the role 
it was afforded. 
 Through the case studies selected, I aim to examine U.S. presidents – and specific 
foreign policy initiatives pursued by their respective administrations – with the hope that 
we will be able to identify religious roles and why those specific roles were put to use.  In 
doing so, we hope to identify historical trends; trends that are capable of providing us 
with explanatory power.   
Theory & Hypothesis  
Religion as a Driver vs Religion as Determinant  
Based upon the theories presented herein regarding the role of religion with 
regard to foreign policy, and contemplating in broad terms how such conceptual theories 
can be applied to presidential decision making, I argue U.S. presidents determine the role 
that they afford religion in foreign policy; religion does not determine or dictate its own 
role.  Rather, religion serves as a driver, driving forth policies the president wishes to 
implement both domestically and internationally.  The manner in which this driver is 
deployed is chosen by the president; he determines which of the examined roles to 
deploy, either (1) giving voice to his personal beliefs, (2) implementing religion for the 
sake of political expediency, as certain situations exist where religion can be used as a 




(4) using religion as a tool for war.  It has been tempting in the past to simply conclude 
that a president’s individual religious beliefs have influenced policy decision making, and 
while there is some truth to this, it is only part of the story.  I suggest that while personal 
religious belief may affect decision making with regard to foreign policy, I would go one 
step further and offer that presidents typically issue a religious response when facing the 
opportunity to significantly change or alter affairs.  As foreign affairs are the focus of this 
paper, we will look to supply examples primarily from the international arena.        
This is not to suggest that personal religious beliefs do not play a substantial role 
when a president chooses to follow this course; a president’s personal religious beliefs 
can actually be highlighted or given a greater voice in a specific role if the right 
circumstances exist.  At this point, it is important for me to state that my study of the 
topic has led me to interpreting that all presidents – even those who profess possessing a 
strong set of religious beliefs – deploy religion throughout their presidency to serve an 





 centuries) have deployed religion in politically expedient ways; and that a select 
few have solely deployed religion as strictly a political tool.      
My hypothesis is that presidents provide religion with multiple roles within one 
administration, dropping one role and picking up another when it is advantageous to them 
or to the advancement of their particular political agenda.  Furthermore, I believe that 
presidents gain a greater proclivity for this when attempting to advance a monumental 
foreign policy move or decision.  When attempting to advance an agenda viewed or 
perceived as monumental, presidents will use strong religious rhetoric, hoping to appeal 







To demonstrate what I have outlined above, I will examine the presidencies of 
Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan, specifically focusing on monumental foreign 
policy decisions and initiatives.  These two presidents have been selected as the case 
studies for this thesis because I find them to be highly representative of all U.S. 
presidents.  Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat and father of the modern progressive 
movement, was a wartime president, having guided the U.S. through World War I.  In 
doing so, he made crucial foreign policy decisions; decisions which included his Fourteen 
Points and League of Nations.
49
  Wilson, a self-professed religious man and son of a 
Presbyterian minister,
50
 was profoundly affected by World War I and his decision making 
bears this out.  Additionally, Wilson’s presidency marks a significant time in American 
history, as the U.S. came to be recognized as a world power towards the conclusion of his 
presidency.         
The presidency of Ronald Reagan also serves as a useful case study, as the 
initiatives of his presidency serve as a counter to those of Wilson.  Reagan, a Republican 
and a staunch conservative, represents the other side of the political spectrum.  Like 
Wilson, he too had notable foreign policy agendas, and he sought to implement 
seemingly radical or monumental policies or changes.  Most notably of course were the 
policies associated with the Reagan Doctrine, a set of policies aimed at dismantling the 
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  Like Wilson, Reagan sought out public support for his foreign policies, 
and like Wilson, he delivered speeches filled with religious undertones, hoping to appeal 
to America’s best hopes, not their worst fears.  Reagan’s single most monumental act of 
course was his role in dismantling the Soviet Union, sharply reducing the threat imposed 
by communism and winning the Cold War.
52
   
To test the stated hypothesis, I will provide an analysis of specific decisions made 
with regard to foreign policy and present evidence testing that the president in question 
determined the role (or roles) that religion would play in the decision or policy; therefore 
dispelling the belief that personal religious beliefs solely dictate the 
direction/implementation of policy.  Evidence supporting my hypothesis will show that 
both Wilson and Reagan – men of significant faith – provided religion with various roles 
when administering foreign policy agendas; and will even include shifting the role within 
one specific policy.  We will be able to detect that Wilson and Reagan determined the 
role of religion rather than religion simply assuming a different role by examining the 
context in which the change occurred.  Each time the role is changed or adapted, it is 
done in response to a major event or policy alteration, which necessitates the need for a 
different role.   
Data 
Woodrow Wilson 
As stated above, the presidency of Woodrow Wilson serves as a useful case study 
for examining how a president can adapt the role of religion to suit his foreign policy 
inclinations.  President Wilson often professed his belief that the US has been chosen by 
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Providence “to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in paths of 
liberty,”
53
 and his foreign policy decision making certainly bears this out.  As discussed 
in the Literature Review portion of this thesis, Wilson was tremendously influenced by 
his faith.  Following the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, John Maynard Keynes stated 
that Wilson conducted himself like a Presbyterian minister “with all the strengths and 
weaknesses of that manner of thinking.”
54
  Before making significant foreign policy 
decisions – decisions that would impact the outcome of World War I – Wilson did not 
hide from the public that religion would be the centerpiece of his presidency.  In his 
second inaugural address, given in March 1917, approximately one month before the U.S. 
would formally enter World War I,
55
 President Wilson declared: 
 “I need not argue these principles to you, my fellow countrymen; they are your 
own part and parcel of your own thinking and your own motives in affairs. They 
spring up native amongst us. Upon this as a platform of purpose and of action 
we can stand together. And it is imperative that we should stand together. We 
are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that now blaze throughout the 
world. In their ardent heat we shall, in God's Providence, let us hope, be purged 
of faction and division, purified of the errant humors of party and of private 
interest, and shall stand forth in the days to come with a new dignity of national 
pride and spirit. Let each man see to it that the dedication is in his own heart, 
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the high purpose of the nation in his own mind, ruler of his own will and 
desire.”
56
 (emphasis added)   
The excerpt taken above from Wilson’s Second Inaugural Address is 
significant because while Wilson is deploying religion – as one may expect, based 
upon his stated affinity for his own religious beliefs – he appears to be deviating 
from the traditional role of religion that he is typically assigned; instead 
incorporating the role of religion as a tool for war.  The religious language in this 
passage is evident, as many of these words as well as the context in which they are 
used are found within the Bible.  Statements such as “God’s Providence,” “purged of 
faction and division,” and words like “purified” invoke a religious connotation.  In 
the excerpt above, Wilson is acknowledging that war is coming to the U.S. and is in 
essence attempting to appeal to his fellow countrymen that the American principles 
they hold dear dictate that the nation must stand united and brace for entrance into 
World War I.  Wilson is appealing to American principles as well as “national pride 
and spirit,” hoping to “…create a new unity amidst the fires that now blaze 
throughout the world.”   
Wilson appears to have laid the foundation for this speech just a few months 
earlier when delivering remarks to the Senate in January 1917.  This address, now 
known as his “Peace Without Victory” speech, captures this same message and again 
serves an example of President Wilson deploying themes of religion and religious 
rhetoric as tools for war:  
                                               
56 Wilson, Woodrow. “Second Inaugural Address." Woodrow Wilson: Second Inaugural Address (January 




“It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in 
that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for 
which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and 
purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever 
since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope 
that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They 
cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be 
challenged. They do not wish to withhold it.”
57
 (emphasis added)    
These remarks by Wilson are very similar to those he delivered just a few 
months later in March 1917.  The choice of language, the underlying themes, the 
president’s strong appeal to American principles and beliefs – all strongly suggest 
that Wilson sought to impart the immediateness and seriousness of the impending 
war – which only religion could provide.  Realizing the gravity of what confronted 
not only the U.S., but the reminder of the world – which was fighting the most 
gruesome and destructive war to date – Wilson deployed religious rhetoric in an 
effort to bind the nation together in a cohesive war effort.         
Wilson’s attempt to appeal to uniquely American principles was a subtle way 
of appealing to relatively commonly held religious beliefs; an act that itself is not 
unique in the history of the U.S.  Indeed, this practice has been used by other 
administrations; however, it is Wilson’s usage of religion in this regard which is 
unique because it represents a clear break his own religious ideology – that religion 
is a guiding force.  While these particular instances suggest that Wilson adapted the 
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role of religion in his presidential decision making, these two closely linked 
instances hardly establish a verifiable trend.  Examining remarks made by President 
Wilson as World War I drew to a close, one can again see that Wilson adapted the 
role of religion to suit his policy initiatives and accomplish endeavors that he 
personally considered monumental.          
Perhaps the most monumental foreign policy endeavor undertaken by 
President Wilson aside from guiding America through World War I was his role in 
personally leading the effort to craft a lasting peace afterward.  While his efforts 
ultimately failed as the Treaty of Versailles and the accompanying US place in the 
League of Nations died on the Senate floor - having been voted down twice
58
 - 
Wilson remained confident throughout the remainder of his life that the American 
public wanted such a peace and that he alone was called by God to secure it.  His 
own deep religious views – which included his deeply seeded belief that he was 
chosen by God to lead the world’s nations to freedom
59
 – as well as the fact that he 
opted to solely represent the U.S. at the peace delegation without representatives 
from either the U.S. Senate nor the House of Representatives, bears this out.
60
  
Addressing the Peace Conference on January 25, 1919, Wilson stated:     
“You can imagine, gentlemen, I dare say, the sentiments and the purpose with 
which representatives of the United States support this great project for a league 
of nations. We regard it as the keystone of the whole program which expressed 
our purposes and ideals in this war and which the associated nations have 
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accepted as the basis of the settlement.  If we returned to the United States 
without having made every effort in our power to realize this program, we 
should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow citizens. For they are a 
body that constitutes a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak their 
thoughts and no private purpose of their own. They expect their representatives 




From these remarks it is clear that Wilson believed that the American people 
fully supported the peace that he was seeking and that he was perfectly attuned to 
their needs, capable of representing them at the highest level.  Towards the end of his 
remarks, President Wilson references the American soldiers who fought in the war, 
suggesting that they willingly went to war after “we had uttered our purposes”
62
; 
those purposes being that the U.S. joined the war to “end all wars” and to serve as 
principle architect of the permanent peace afterward.  However, Wilson references 
the U.S. soldiers in unique fashion: 
“They came as crusaders, not merely to win a war, but to win a cause; and I am 
responsible to them, for it fell to me to formulate the purposes for which I asked 
them to fight, and I, like them, must be a crusader for these things, whatever the 
costs and whatever it may be necessary to do…”
63
 (emphasis added)      
Reference to American soldiers as “crusaders” again carries a certain religious 
connotation, as does Wilson’s own reference to himself as a fellow “crusader” who is 
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attempting to secure the purpose of their case “whatever the costs.”  When the reader 
considers the passage above with Malcolm Magee’s report that Wilson was personally 
called by God to go to Versailles and alone negotiate the peace
64
, one can come away 
with the sense that Wilson perhaps saw himself as a modern-day messiah.  The fact that 
he deeply believed that he alone was to see such a monumental undertaking through to 
completion, no matter the consequences, definitely bears a Christ-like resemblance.  
Similarly, Magee references a poem written by Edward Park Davis comparing Wilson’s 
second inauguration to the second coming of Christ; a poem which likens Wilson’s 
speech to that of the “human man” and his thoughts to those of “living God.”
65
  Wilson 
apparently appreciated being mentioned as “David” and the “High Priest” (other 
references to Wilson from Davis’ poem), as he wrote the poet, thanking him by stating 
that the poem had “touched me more than I know how to say.”
66
            
Wilson was dismayed to arrive back in the U.S. in July 1919 only to find no 
support for his planned peace.
67
  From negotiating at the peace conference until his 
death in February 1924,
68
 Wilson maintained the belief that he was the moral leader 
of the world and that one day, perhaps after his time, the U.S. would join the League 
of Nations and that he alone had been called to lead the world’s nations to freedom.
69
      
Wilson is often regarded in presidential histories as a Chief Executive who 
evenly and thoroughly applied his deeply held religious beliefs in a principled 
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manner.  From the analysis above, it is clear that these religious beliefs influenced 
his decision making, especially those pertaining to the administration of US foreign 
policy.  It is also evident that the rhetoric he delivered in order to sway the American 
public of these policies often carried religious undertones.  However, from the 
analysis presented above, one can see that the role President Wilson gave to religion 
in foreign policy was more varied and not as consistent as most histories would have 
the reader believe.  Contrary to popular belief, Woodrow Wilson provided religion 
with various roles throughout his administration, adapting the role to suit his policy 
needs.   
Ronald Reagan 
If Woodrow Wilson represents the political “left,” Ronald Reagan serves as a strong 
counter, representing the political “right.”  Representing the other portion of the political 
spectrum and also having served as a wartime president (albeit a “cold” war), Ronald 
Reagan serves as a useful case study for anyone seeking to understand how religion can 
be deployed in multiple roles in order to accomplish foreign policy initiatives.  Like 
Wilson, religion played a critical role throughout Reagan’s Administration; as he too 
delivered religious responses when confronted with monumental foreign policy issues.     
These initiatives of course all center on communism, which was recognized as the 
great evil of the post-war era.  Ronald Reagan was not one to shy away from his 
convictions, especially those regarding communism, which he considered a moral evil 
and an unnatural phenomenon.
70
  Before entering politics – much less ascending to the 
presidency – citizen Reagan vehemently condemned communism; particularly the brand 
promoted by the Soviet Union.  In 1964, speaking on behalf of Republican presidential 
                                               




nominee Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan warned against the proposed policy of 
accommodation, putting forth publicly his hardline stance on communism; a stance that 
was fundamentally fused to his own religious beliefs.  Warning of accommodation, he 
said:  
“…there is a simple answer—not an easy answer— but simple: If you and I 
have the courage to tell our elected officials that we want our national policy 
based on what we know in our hearts is morally right. We cannot buy our 
security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an immorality 
so great as saying to a billion human beings now enslaved behind the Iron 
Curtain, “Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skins, we’re 
willing to make a deal with your slave masters.” Alexander Hamilton said, “A 
nation which can prefer disgrace to danger is prepared for a master, and deserves 
one.” Now let’s set the record straight. There’s no argument over the choice 
between peace and war, but there’s only one guaranteed way you can have 
peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”
71
 (emphasis added)    
Here, in 1964, Reagan made it clear that he found communism reprehensible on 
moral grounds; a view that historians have linked to the fact that his strong political 
views were rooted in the Judeo-Christian values he maintained throughout his life.
72
  
Reagan explicitly links the aforementioned remarks on civil morality with religious 
belief when advocating the faith-based foreign policy of Barry Goldwater (which he 
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advocated himself by endorsing).  In the same set of remarks, when describing the 
foundation of Goldwater’s foreign policy, Reagan quotes Goldwater:  
“There is no foundation like the rock of honesty and fairness, and when you 
begin to build your life on that rock, with the cement of the faith in God that you 
have, then you have a real start.”
73
 (emphasis added)  
In the overall context of this speech, Reagan appears to be providing religion a 
traditional voice while making his foreign policy recommendations; in essence he is 
suggesting that commonly held Christian beliefs be integrated into the nation’s 
national policy and guide her conduct abroad.   
Towards the closing of his remarks, Ronald Reagan again explicitly references 
religion and religious imagery when establishing his hardline stance towards the 
Soviet Union.  Further deriding the policy of accommodation (appeasement), Reagan 
states: 
“You and I know and do not believe that life is so dear and peace so sweet as to 
be purchased at the price of chains and slavery.  If nothing in life is worth dying 
for, when did this begin – just in the face of this enemy?  Or should Moses have 
told the children of Israel to live in slavery under the pharaohs?  Should Christ 
have refused the cross?”
74
 (emphasis added)     
These remarks contain clear references to religious figures and in citing them 
during his remarks, Reagan is hoping to appeal to those in the U.S. who identify with 
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such religious teachings – or at least those with familiarity with these Biblical 
figures.   
Reagan maintained this stance on communism after winning the presidency in 
1980, and he continued to provide religion a similar role when describing his 
strategy for how the U.S. would engage with communism.  President Reagan put his 
strategy into practice in 1982 when he visited Pope John Paul II in Rome; a trip that 
he took in order to work with the Pope on efforts to combat communism in Poland.
75
  
On this highly visible trip, Reagan arranged to provide an estimated $50 million to 
the Pope’s papal funds, intended to support clandestine actions in Poland.
76
  This act 
–which included trust and collaboration with a religious leader – again illustrates the 
appreciation and inclination that Reagan exhibited early into his presidency for 
giving religion a prominent role in the execution of his foreign policy aims.      
Following his remarks in 1964 and his trip to the Vatican to visit Pope John Paul 
II in 1982, Reagan addressed the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983, 
stating:  
“…they must understand that we will never compromise our principles and 
standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our 
belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace.” 
“…let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian 
darkness – pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let 
us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its 
omnipresence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all 
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From the excerpts of his “Evil Empire” speech, it seems as though President 
Reagan built upon the moral argument against communism that he presented to the 
American people in 1964 and reinforced it.  Certainly he is advocating a traditional 
role for religion in dismantling the largest obstacle America faced from a foreign 
policy perspective: communism.  While Reagan is again providing religion with a 
traditional role in this speech, a shift would occur shortly thereafter with the public 
introduction of the Reagan Doctrine.   
Seeking a more forceful and confrontational approach to dealing with the Soviet 
Union, Reagan proposed a foreign policy doctrine that advocated overt, kinetic 
military action and unrestricted support of anti-communist forces.
78
  This foreign 
policy agenda, known as the Reagan Doctrine, sought to add a strong and obvious 
component to the covert and subtle policies that were already in place.  This pairing 
led to series of foreign policy endeavors which included the funding of the Contras 
in Nicaragua, the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada and intervention in Lebanon.
79
  In 
launching this new initiative, President Reagan tweaked the role of religion; shifting 
it from the traditional role that it had enjoyed earlier in his presidency to the role of 
political tool, seeking to win and maintain public support for his administration’s 
foreign policies.  Following the bombing of the American barracks in Beirut, 
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Lebanon, Reagan delivered an address to the American public aimed at informing 
the nation of the bombing in Lebanon, alleviating the nation’s fears and consoling 
those grieving the American loss of life.  Using the first portion of his address to 
accomplish these aims, Reagan used the second portion to answer the American 
public’s question: Why were our forces in harm’s way?    
“If we turned our backs on Lebanon now, what would be the future of Israel? 
…If terrorism and intimidation succeed, it'll be a devastating blow to the peace 
process and to Israel's search for genuine security. It won't just be Lebanon 
sentenced to a future of chaos. Can the United States, or the free world, for that 
matter, stand by and see the Middle East incorporated into the Soviet bloc? 
…We're a nation with global responsibilities. We're not somewhere else in the 
world protecting someone else's interests; we're there protecting our own.”
80
 
From these remarks, the reader can see that Reagan is trying to reinforce his policy 
of U.S. intervention in the Middle East.  He is also attempting to persuade the American 
public that the sacrifices already made must not be in vain; that the U.S. must persevere if 
change is to be exacted in the Middle East.  Israel is referenced in the selected series of 
quotes above, but Israel is mentioned throughout the president’s address and he suggests 
that the alliance between the U.S. and Israel is one based upon shared principles, beliefs, 
morals and standards.  Regarding Israel, Reagan states that “Since 1948 our Nation has 
recognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as 
a nation. Israel shares our democratic values…”
81
  Referencing Israel in this regard, 
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President Reagan is deploying the subtle side of his doctrine and is giving religion a 
traditional role, again albeit subtle.  Reagan continues in this vein, but also mixes in the 
second portion of the Reagan Doctrine, supporting the U.S. troops affected and calling on 
U.S. citizens to do the same:   
 “ They were not afraid to stand up for their country or, no matter how difficult 
and slow the journey might be, to give to others that last, best hope of a better 
future. We cannot and will not dishonor them now and the sacrifices they've 
made by failing to remain as faithful to the cause of freedom and the pursuit of 
peace as they have been.”
82
 (emphasis added)  
In this passage, Reagan is referencing the overt and kinetic; the sacrifices made by 
the military to accomplish the policy goals that he has laid forth.  By referencing this, 
Reagan is appealing to the American public that the task, though difficult, must be 
pursued and that the goal of peace and freedom must be attained.  Using this language, 
President Reagan is attempting to secure public support.  The religious tones here are 
subtle and generalized and in part relate to civil morality, but they are present and 
effective.  By calling Americans to be “faithful to the cause of freedom,” and faithful to 
the ideals held by Marines killed in action,
83
 Reagan is using religion – specifically 
religious tones – as a political tool; hoping to maintain public support for his 
administration’s intervention in the Middle East.       
From his entrance into politics until the end of the Cold War, Ronald Reagan 
continued to condemn communism on moral grounds and often appealed to the Judeo-
Christian faith that was prevalent throughout the U.S. in order to find support for his 
                                               





initiatives.  Later, as the Cold War was heating up just before going cold forever, Reagan 
altered the role he gave religion in foreign policy, using it as a political tool to win 
support and advance his more confrontational and kinetic policies.  Like Wilson, Reagan 
is often remembered for a particular stance on religion and for providing it with a 
particular role in his application of foreign policy.  However, analysis has again shown 
that Ronald Reagan also adapted the role of religion with regard to foreign policy, 
switching between roles in order to advance specific aims.             
Discussion 
After analyzing notable speeches regarding major foreign policy initiatives given 
by both Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan, I found that both presidents provided 
religion different roles throughout their presidencies, adapting them in order to craft and 
support policies aimed at producing monumental outcomes.  Examining major foreign 
policy agendas and goals promoted by President Wilson, I determined that Wilson 
deployed religion as a tool for war, later shifting the role to the traditional role of religion 
as a guiding force.  President Reagan likewise varied the role that religion held with 
regard to foreign policy, as he shifted from the religion in its traditional role to religion as 
a political tool.  The speeches examined by both presidents and the foreign policy 
agendas that these speeches aimed at propelling forward were chosen because they 
represent each president’s significant or monumental agendas.   
I believe that the case studies selected demonstrated that religion can hold 
multiple roles in a president’s foreign policy agenda, even in presidencies as polarizing as 
Wilson’s and Reagan’s.  Analyses of these two presidencies has shown that the role of 




put forth a religious response when they perceive that it will advance their policy 
interests.  In the example of Wilson, he deployed religious rhetoric in an effort to unite 
the nation in preparation for entrance into World War I; certainly a monumental decision, 
and even more so when considering the context of the early 20
th
 century (the U.S. had not 
been a participant in a conflict that large with so much potentially at stake).  Reagan 
likewise deployed religion in an effort to advance policies aimed at defeating 
communism and dismantling the Soviet Union, the only world power posing a threat to 
the US, which also represents a “monumental” undertaking.       
The case studies of Presidents Wilson and Reagan were compatible with my 
stated hypothesis, which is that U.S. presidents determine the role that they give religion 
in foreign policy; religion does not determine or dictate its own role.  It is important to 
note that while both Wilson and Reagan maintained deeply held religious beliefs 
(especially Wilson), they were effective managers of their own beliefs.  By this I mean 
that they chose when to give voice to their personal beliefs; they allowed them to come 
through in speeches to the American public only when they decided doing so would be 
beneficial.  Religion did not dictate a role with either president; they instead deployed 
religion in a way that would advance their political agendas.   
President Wilson and President Reagan were chosen because I found them to be 
very representative of other administrations.  Selecting one democrat and one republican 
was obvious, but it was important to select individuals who were representative of the 
two dominant political ideologies that exist in the U.S.; therefore, selecting the most 
polarizing individuals of the modern progressive and conservative movements, 




and deed, I believe that they are also representative of presidents who are not 
remembered as particularly memorable or polarizing.  Perhaps the single largest reason 
for this is that both men were political upstarts, as neither ever had any intention of 
joining politics – let alone being remembered for contributions made while they were in 
office.  Woodrow Wilson had been an academic most of his professional career, teaching 
at the university level for nearly 30 years.
84
 Ronald Reagan, born in 1911, was a famous 
movie and television actor for the first half of his life, not entering politics until he 
became Governor of California in 1967.
85
  Before their respective starts in politics, each 
man was a citizen who aspired to engage in something other than politics; it was not until 
much later in life, when moved by powerful events, that these men decided to become 
public servants.  Both Wilson and Reagan spent much of their lives as political outsiders 
– as American citizens – and therefore had ordinary experiences that make them relatable 
to other men to have held that office.    
While both of the carefully selected and highly representative case studies 
selected supported my hypothesis, it is important to note that additional research in this 
area would be necessary to definitely establish any existing trends.  However, the 
research contained in this thesis serves as a useful starting point and has laid a foundation 
for additional research in this area.         
Conclusion  
In closing, I believe that I have answered the question I presented at the outset of 
this paper: What roles can religion play in the creation of the president’s foreign policy 
agenda; can these roles change, and do executives submit a religious response when 
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confronted with specific foreign policy issues?  My research has shown that religion can 
play a prominent role in the president’s foreign policy agenda, and that the role is 
constantly adapted – even by more polarizing presidents who historically have been 
depicted differently.  I believe that I also illustrated that religion’s role is determined by 
the president; it is not dictated.  Personal inclinations certainly play a role, but they are 
not the whole story.  Personally held religious beliefs certainly play a role, but the 
influence this has is often determined by what is politically expedient.     
I think that this research has been useful in allowing people to see that polarizing 
presidents – even those as polarizing as Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan – are more 
multidimensional than most people give them credit for.  Countless histories have been 
produced on these extraordinary men; and many of these histories are lacking in that they 
simply peg Wilson a “progressive democrat” and Reagan as “a champion of modern 
conservatism.”  Few histories address these men’s religious views and even less address 
the role that religion played in their decision making as it pertained to foreign policy.  
Both of these men presided over incredibly significant phases of American history; 
Wilson over World War I and America’s rise to the ranks of world-class hegemon; 
Reagan over the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.  Moving 
forward, I think that if U.S. presidents and their foreign policy decision making is studied 
from this perspective, that one can develop a new appreciation for the leaders of our 
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America is often referred to as the world’s indispensable nation; a title that has 
invited both praise and criticism abroad.  While the validity of that generality can be 
argued, one cannot dispute that the United States has continually championed values 
synonymous with our way of life, to include individual freedom consistent with law and 
order, and self-determination.  Forming the foundation of civil society, the defense of 
these values worldwide is in America’s best interest.  To advance and uphold these 
values, it is important that a carefully constructed and thoughtful foreign policy strategy 
be assembled.  U.S. foreign policy is not only a set of mandates that apply to people 
beyond our shores; rather, they are an extension of who we are.     
As such, it is imperative that policymakers and strategists agree upon a 
framework for identifying threats to definitive U.S. interests and recognize the benefits 
associated with the development of a foreign policy strategy rooted in geopolitical 
thought.  While the defense of the aforementioned values may suggest a foreign policy 
rooted in liberalism – a theory revolving predominantly around values – U.S. foreign 
policy must take into account the limitations associated with our form of limited 
government; it must also account for the unescapable realities of our world.   
Our resources, though vast, are not endless; a grim reality that is constantly 
broadcast by our own government.  This, paired with waning public interest in events 
abroad brought on by over a decade of war, have led to calls for a less engaged America.  
Some have called for the pursuit of a “peace dividend,” and for a more inward-looking 
America. But history has not been kind to nations who have eschewed their commitments 




and irresponsible; it diminishes our standing, leads to increased insecurity, and 
emboldens foes.  We hypothesize that American security can be restored and national 
interests better secured by formulating a foreign policy rooted in geopolitical thought.    
To make this case, it is necessary to first gain an understanding of what 
geopolitics is and is not.  By completing this fundamental yet necessary chore, we can 
then examine the field of geopolitics in order to select the geopolitical theory that 
contains the greatest explanatory power.   
Geopolitics is probably best described as the study of the rise and fall of nations 
in their constant quest for greater power relative to each other.  Sir Halford Mackinder, 
perhaps the most influential thinker on the subject, suggested that geopolitics was the 
“…survival of men within the order of civilization.”
86
  As much, he explained the 
intrinsic relationship between geography and history in order to explain state-to-state 
interaction:  
[It was] once remarked that the geographer thinks of shapes.  Might we not 
complete the idea with the statement that the true historian thinks in movements 
– movements upon the shapes of the geographer?  Both of them see with the 
mind’s eye.
87
   
Mackinder’s insistence on the primacy of both history and geography suggests 
that these two important aspects be kept in mind during our analysis.  A British 
geographer who was immensely influential on those tasked with crafting the strategic 
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policies pursued by western powers following World War II,
88
 Mackinder presents us 
with a good starting point.    
The following will primarily be concerned with providing the reader with an 
analysis of major geopolitical theories as they pertain to international relations (IR) and 
foreign policy formulation.  In providing an overview of key literature, we will begin 
making the argument for a foreign policy rooted in geopolitical thought.     
Literature Review 
Theories of Modern Geopolitics  
Mackinder’s most noted work, Democratic Ideals and Reality, is considered a 
classic on the intersection of geography, history, and world power and was his attempt 
“to bridge the growing gap between the sciences and the humane arts.”
89
  Containing 
many noteworthy observations, his insistence that world politics had fundamentally 
changed with the dawn of the “closed system”
90
 is perhaps most important.  He argued 
that there are no more worldly frontiers; “there is no longer elasticity of political 
expansion in lands beyond the pale.”
91
  He surmised that conflict between nations would 
be more common and that, “Every shock, every disaster or superfluity” will now be felt 
across the globe.
92
  Writing in 1942, Mackinder’s thinking contained impressive 
foresight, as his analysis has proved true in our age of globalization.  The years following 
the close of World War II – arguably the last truly decisive war – were not followed by 
years of peace.  Instead, the numerous proxy wars that came to symbolize the Cold War 
materialized and metastasized into a century of near-constant conflict.  This reflects well 
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on our hypothesis; as this indicates that the central tenets of geopolitical thought are 
unavoidable and must be given a place in foreign policy formulation.         
Mackinder also addressed the role of technology, suggesting that certain 
technologies could provide the state with strategic opportunities,
93
 but warned that 
technology could not override realities such as geography, history, and culture.  This is 
probably Mackinder’s greatest contribution, as it tells us how geopolitics fits in with 
prominent international relations theories.  If one acknowledges that the aforementioned 
realities are necessary to the formulation of international policy, then one would 
subscribe to the schools such as realism and possibly neo-conservatism, eschewing 
liberalism and constructivism.        
Likewise, an analysis of the 20
th
 century reflects well on this observation posited 
by Mackinder; as the last century was certainly a period of constant conflict – most of 
which was ideologically driven – and war evolved from a wholly-national production to a 
technologically-driven ordeal; a transformation that has not exactly produced definitive 
results.  This suggests that technology cannot overcome certain particularly imposing 
realities.     
Nicholas J. Spykman, the first to refine Mackinder’s theories, thought deeply 
about what America’s role should be after World War II.  The Geography of Peace, 
published in 1944, was prophetic in that he accurately predicted how war-torn Europe 
and Asia would align themselves in the bipolar world that became the defining 
characteristic of the 20
th
 century.         
Like Mackinder, Spykman realized the importance of geography; however, he 
insisted that control of the world’s rimlands – not the heartland prescribed by Mackinder 
                                               




– was the seat of geopolitical power.
94
  Whereas Mackinder saw power permeate outward 
from within the great landmass of the heartland (Russia), Spykman saw “encirclement,” 
the containment and incorporation of territory via the rimlands (the Asiatic and European 
littorals) as the top strategic move that could be made by an expansionary power.
95
   
Spykman asserted that the U.S. was vulnerable due to technological advances in 
sea and air power, as these technologies assisted aggressive powers bridge the defensive 
barriers of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
96
  This differed from Mackinder, who wrote 
that technology could not completely negate advantages associated with geography.  This 
inferred vulnerability led Spykman to advocate for an interventionist U.S. foreign policy, 
stating that “it is the interest of this country to throw its weight into the scales to prevent 
any such aggressive action from taking place.”
97
  Calling for a national policy of “peace 
through strength,” Spykman wrote:  
If, then, the security of a nation depends ultimately on the strength which it can 
command for its defense, the political strategy whose objective is to guarantee 
security must maintain the state’s power in peace time.
98
   
Crafted during World War II and exercised during the Cold War, Spykman’s 
geopolitical ideas contain considerable merit.  While the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
reflects favorably on Spykman, perhaps his theories only had applicability in a bipolar 
world.  Is the world today too complex – is power too diffuse to construct a foreign 
policy agenda modeled on such a seemingly simple principle?     
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Colin S. Gray is best categorized as a contemporary of Spykman, as he insisted on 
the primacy of physical security
99
 and the importance of hard power in world politics.  He 
reinserted history into the geopolitical equation, warning that it had been frequently 
overlooked
100
 (it had been taken out in the crafting of various postwar theories, namely 
institutionalism).  Gray argued that hard power is non-negotiable, and that it is the only 
reliable political tool.  We see the rise of regional powers in Eurasia and their military 
buildup – congruent with the stagnation of U.S. military technology, declining 
competitive advantages brought on by the proliferation of dual-use technology and 
sequestration, and personnel cuts across the services – as all making the case for Gray – 
and therefore for a more prominent role for geopolitics in national strategy.   
Journalist Robert D. Kaplan maintained that geography remains crucial to 
geopolitics; even in an age where technology is viewed as an equalizer, as “the exercise 
of continuous influence or control requires the physical presence of armed people in the 
area at issue.”
101
  Simply put, technology is not a panacea for boots on the ground.  The 
seemingly unceasing insurgencies plaguing the Middle East suggests that geography still 
wins out over technology and that geopolitical considerations – such as geography – have 
not been given enough credence by strategists.     
To engineer his theory, Kaplan borrowed from Paul Bracken, who observed that 
while the west is focused on globalization, Eurasia is absorbed with nationalism and 
                                               
99 Gray, Colin S. The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological 
Revolution. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 3. 
100 Ibid, 35. 
101 Kaplan, Robert D., The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the 






 which may lead to “the shrinking of the Eurasian 
chessboard”
103
  With this in mind, one can only wonder if Asia will follow Europe; 
turning outward aggressively after decades of internal focus.  Again, world events speaks 
well this idea, as regional powers such as China, India and Japan continue to grow with 
the ultimate goal of expelling U.S. influence from the region.   
These regional powers’ desire to expel American influence is perhaps best 
explained by their rich histories – each of the aforementioned boast longstanding cultures 
who established empires and enjoyed unparalleled dominance.  America’s heavy 
footprint in the Asia-Pacific is at odds with millennia of history – a reality that no doubt 
rubs these countries the wrong way.  A foreign policy with such geopolitical 
considerations at its core would arguably anticipate such sentiment; meaning that a 
national policy could be crafted to effectively deal with it.         
Henry Kissinger, a practitioner of realism, argues for a U.S. foreign policy rooted 
in geopolitical thought on the same grounds that we do.  In his latest work, World Order, 
he sets out to illustrate how historical events have dictated the rise and collapse of 
nations.  In cataloguing events of historical significance, Kissinger makes it clear that 
history dictates a country’s internal political makeup as well as their political posture 
abroad. 
To showcase this, Kissinger examines the history of Russia.  He surmises that 
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is a result of her uneven past; one largely of constant 
national threat.  He writes that Viking raids from the north, Arab incursions from the 
south and Mongol invasions from the east (all of which occurred in her early history), has 
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left Russia to reside in a state of permanent anxiety, constantly fearing invasion.
104
  
Kissinger supposes that Russia is cursed by her tremendous size, an asset when 
considering the natural resources at her disposal, but a liability when considering the 
security implications.  Considering these things, Kissinger writes that Russia’s inability 
to dominating its territory and seize all available power (an impossibility) has led to an 
advantageous and aggressive national identity, making Russia a unique threat.   
In making such a conclusion, Kissinger is suggesting that an appreciation of 
history is a necessity in predicting action on the world stage.  We would agree with this, 
and argue that theories of schools of IR that fail to realize this are likely to be untrue and 
produce ineffective policy. If you choose to neglect history and observe what has come 
before you, how can one expect to have any insight into what is yet to come?  The answer 
here that you cannot; to neglect the past is to retreat from the responsibilities of the 
future.           
In The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski attempted to map the geopolitical 
landscape of Eurasia (his chessboard) following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  He 
wrote that a rejection of American overtures in Eurasia would translate to an end of 
American primacy and the end of U.S. influence in Eurasia.
105
  The activity of Asian 
countries over the past decade, including the cultivation of nationalism and increased 
military spending seem to indicate that they are moving to oust U.S. influence sooner 
than later.   
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Brzezinski’s inclusion of Ukraine as a major geopolitical “pivot” (a state 
occupying a sensitive location or acting as a defensive buffer
106
) also lends credibility to 
his work.  He wrote that Russian possession of Ukraine guaranteed her a role in European 
politics, and provided her with the opportunity to pursue an empire (he cited Ukraine’s 
significant population, resource wealth and Black Sea access as desirable enablers).
107
  
Brzezinski’s observations explain well the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula 
as well as the reboot in Russian revanchism generally.  The analysis being made here by 
Brzezinski is similar to that of Kaplan; and therefore, the argument we suggest is similar 
too.  Asian countries are seeking to reclaim their place as historical world powers – a 
phenomenon best explained by the historical component of geopolitics.        
Angelo M. Codevilla, a professor of international relations, argued for a common-
sense based approach to geopolitics that is anchored in truly American interests.  He 
wrote that America should not respond to every world crisis, as this would result in 
attempting to manage the globe; a prospect that no power – even the U.S. – is capable 
of.
108
  He wrote that “confusing your country’s interests with anybody else’s…guarantees 
you will end up harming all you touch.”
109
  This is profound in that it succinctly describes 
the single biggest flaw in U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.        
A determination of what true “wants and needs” are is crucial to survival and 
security in a multipolar world.  This, Codevilla wrote, will require “transcending Liberal 
Interventionism, Neoconservatism, and Realism – all variations of an ideology that 
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assumes America’s objectives and powers are essentially limitless.”
110
  Along with 
transcendence, he advocated for a return to the basics, which included strength of arms; 
reasoning that well-equipped troops will reassure friends while keeping foes at bay.
111
  
He wrote that “Whether others like us or not is their business.  Whether they respect us or 
not is ours,”
112
  a reminder that in an anarchic world – where powers of differing 
backgrounds maintain different values – hard power is always respected; whereas 
weakness is provocative.       
By writing that we must transcend various schools of IR, Codevilla is arguing for 
a foreign policy solely based on present realities – or, geopolitical considerations.  In 
essence, he argues what we set to make clear in our introduction; that American 
resources, while vast, are not infinite.  Therefore, a tailored policy must be implemented 
by calculating the realities of the present in an effort to achieve maximum results.  A 
foreign policy untethered to reality is sure to fail and squander precious resources.     
Counterviews to Geopolitics  
Those who suggest that realities such as history and geography can be overcome 
are categorized as the critics of classical geopolitical thought.  One critic, John Agnew, 
argued that American hegemony has been made possible by globalization, writing that 
international institutions have normalized and spread American-style marketplace 
society, which has led to the adoption of American norms and standards.
113
  He wrote 
that globalization is a “hegemonic project” of the US that represents “a dramatic 
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quickening and geographical reformulation….”
114
   It is undeniable that globalization has 
forever changed the world, but to suggest that it has reformulated the geographical 
landscape is somewhat farfetched.  If so many of the international institutions embodying 
American values have transformed the landscape, why then does America often refuse to 
participate in them?  Because we realize that we can only count on our material resources 
and capabilities; we possess a healthy skepticism that international institutions can 
regulate world politics in a meaningful way.
115
 
Beyond these incentives, Agnew wonders if the economic and political cost of 
modern warfare between evenly matched foes now outweighs “any conceivable 
collective benefit national populations can derive from it.”
116
  We would argue that this 
flies counter to common sense, as such a calculation seemingly discounts history as well 
as social and political pressures, all of which have continually led to war.   
Like Agnew, Melvin Goodman wrote that the desire to participate in globalization 
can prompt nations to transcend their “past mistakes” in an effort to work towards 
creating cooperative relationships.
117
  Goodman also believed that that U.S. foreign 
policy could use various political and economic institutions – tools of soft power – to 
foster liberal norms and standards.
118
   
While one can argue that these tools have yielded some success, there have also 
been instances throughout history that indicate clearly that there are cultures and 
ideologies that cannot be wooed by elements of soft power; respecting only the tangible.  
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Goodman’s suggestion that countries will more or less forsake their individual identities 
in order to adopt an internationalist identity is questionable as there is little in the 
historical record to suggest that this is a likely outcome.  It also defies human nature, as 
people tend to feel proud of their nation’s roots, particularly if it is an ancient culture.
119
  
With many of our geopolitical foes being ancient nations, it is unlikely that they will 
adopt an internationalist persona.   
The problem with Goodman’s view is further compounded by the fact that 
national identity is multi-dimensional, and consists of attributes including: historic 
homeland/territory, common myths and historical memories, and a publicly shared 
culture
120
 – all of which are best explained by geopolitics; the study of understanding 
state-to-state interaction though the synthesis of geography, history, politics, and 
culture.
121
     
Gerry Kearns critiques the conservative geopolitics of Mackinder, writing that it 
is “our turn…to challenge the inevitability of globalization and the emergence of a global 
state…”
122
  Advocating for what he coins as progressive geopolitics, he posits that 
American unipolarity has passed and that a new strategic policy must be crafted to 
accommodate the rising powers constituting the multipolar world.  He harshly critiques 
conservative geopolitics, writing that it “Comprehends…elements of the geopolitical 
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imaginary, including a view of the world as containing incompatible civilizations, hostile 
states, intense spatial integration, political anarchy, and relentless conflict.”
123
 
Kearns asserts that the most effective way of operating on the global stage is to 
involve multilateral institutions,
124
 which are viable tools because of their ability to 
channel elements of soft power in an effort to collect information, formulate international 
campaigns and lobby on behalf of the many.
125
  He wrote that the world is well 
positioned to leverage the benefits that non-governmental institutions (NGOs) can 
provide, as there are roughly 30,000 today (compared to nearly 1,000 in 1950).
126
 
Kearns borrowed from Robert Jackson, who argued that if people across the globe 
are to interact, then the world community must settle upon a set of mutually agreeable 
terms that transcend cultures and civilizations.
127
  Jackson suggested that this is feasible 
because the “respect for the sovereignty of individual states” has evolved and ultimately 
taken form in multilateral agencies such as the United Nations (UN).
128
  The problem 
with this view is obvious, as state sovereignty is not respected throughout the world – one 
need only point to border disputes and annexed territory to refute this claim.   
Received Knowledge  
Old School Lessons for the Future  
The fact that both Mackinder and Spykman are still regularly cited by leading 
foreign policy professionals and practitioners indicates that their ideas are still applicable 
today; but whose ideas are the most relevant?  Mackinder’s prescient 1942 claim that the 
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world was finally a “closed system” is still paramount because it mandates that policies 
enacted by the state be constantly reconsidered, as the consequences of those policies will 
ripple across the globe in an unpredictable fashion.  Spykman’s theory of encirclement 
was relevant to the 20
th
 century, but the globe is no longer divided between east and west, 
and the cost of encircling foes is simply too expensive and is becoming increasingly 
untenable in an age of austerity where limited state resources are being devoted to 
domestic programs – a policy choice to be sure, but a reality that policymakers must 
come to terms with nonetheless.  A strategy requiring the forward-staging of military 
forces (including all service support required to keep them combat-ready), tremendous 
political capital and wide constituent support, encirclement in the historical sense is not 
likely to be pursued unless overwhelming public support can be secured; as containment 
of top geopolitical foes would require an overabundance of public support and national 
resources – neither of which are likely to be readily given for the reasons outlined above.          
The realities of the past have not diminished in the present and they are unlikely 
to do so in the future, as the world’s geography will remain static and nations will 
continue to rely heavily upon natural resources for growth and sustainment; both of 
which will likely lead to continuing involvement in the affairs of the resource-rich 
“pivots” (countries making up Central Asia that are endowed with tremendous resource 
wealth) by the world’s major players.
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Ideas forwarded by contemporaries of Mackinder who acknowledge that certain 
realities remain indispensable geopolitical considerations – including Gray and Kaplan 
among others – are therefore best suited to explain events taking place in the world today.  
                                               




As detailed above, progressive geopolitics and similar views critical of conservative 
geopolitics fail to fully address the realities that dictate human interaction.   
Theory & Hypothesis 
Fundamental Principles & Respect for the Uncompromising  
History has shown that democracies often demonstrate a proclivity to gravitate 
towards policies and institutions linked to progressive geopolitics; many of the 
fundamental qualities of democratic government and classical liberalism – individual 
liberty, capitalism and economic opportunity – are also core components of international 
institutions designed to promote human rights and expand global cooperation.  
Conversely, it has been observed that democracies too easily forgo defense preparedness 
in order to seek the coveted “peace dividend.”  This is perhaps true today, where there are 
no obvious foes.  Instead, our foes exist in the shadows, hidden from view.  Harold W. 
Rood wrote “Those who warn of war and the need to prepare for it are not welcome 
prophets in a democratic society.  They will be dismissed today…as minions of a 
“military-industrial complex” and considered beyond the pale of decent folk...”
130
             
We would posit that the United States is at risk of becoming another yet another 
democracy to stumble pursuing such a dividend, having been too reliant on the tools of 
progressive geopolitics – a process which has resulted in generally ineffective policy. 
Repeatedly ineffective policy has led to diminished geopolitical standing and a more 
insecure world.  We hypothesize that American geopolitical dominance and global 
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security can be restored and national interests secured by emphasizing fundamental 
principles of conservative geopolitics.   
We cannot overemphasize the uncompromising nature of culture, geography and 
history in the formulation of geopolitical strategy.  The past is rife with examples of great 
perils that befell humanity because world leaders failed to grasp their importance in 
strategic decision-making.  Therefore, views that fail to consider these elements or 
discount them too much are not useful.   
For example, while globalization has led to the spread of American norms and 
standards, it has not served as a catalyst for unmitigated global transformation; we are 
still a world of nations with national agendas that often run counter to the agendas of 
international organizations.  While organizations such as NATO and the UN are 
awesome in theory, their large membership renders them largely ineffective, as the goals 
of member nations are too diverse to be succinctly summarized in a cohesive mission 
statement.    
Methodology  
Old Answers to New Problems?  
To determine if conservative geopolitics conforms to the strategic framework of 
the U.S. and is best suited to defend her definitive national interests, we will examine 
recent documents released by the United States Government (USG) to determine what 
her core interests are.  To do so, we will draw primarily from the National Security 
Council (NSC).  Tasked with creating documents in conjunction with the executive 
branch, the NSC publishes documents highlighting major national security concerns; 




without doing so, major national security concerns cannot be adequately identified or 
prioritized.  
We will then examine a number of significant international developments 
affecting those interests with the aim of discerning if conservative geopolitics can explain 
them, and if policies rooted in conservative geopolitics can favorably address them.  By 
following this course, we can determine if conservative geopolitics should be the basis of 
U.S. foreign policy.  We will subsequently be positioned to make recommendations 
leveraging the political tools at our disposal, while clearly articulating both our intent and 
our strategy.  By doing so, we can send a clear message to our would-be adversaries and 
hopefully broadcast a message of resolve and strength – arguably lacking components of 
current U.S. foreign policy strategy.    
As a product of the NSC and the executive more broadly, U.S. National Security 
Strategy (NSS) is the best place to look when attempting to identify U.S. national 
interests – as both are involved in the prioritization of security concerns; a process 
requiring an understanding of what constitutes a national interest.  As one may expect, 
interests are identified at the outset, and include: 1) security of the United States, its 
citizens, allies and partners, 2) a strong and growing economy, devoted to the promotion 
of opportunity and prosperity, 3) respect for universal values, and 4) an international 
order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity.
131
  
Congruently, top national security priorities are also listed, and include: 1) 
nonproliferation and nuclear security, 2) defeat of al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist 
                                               




organizations, 3) Iraqi sovereignty and Middle East peace, and 4) renewed economic 
security, stability and growth.
132
 
The White House has acknowledged that there are limits to what American power 
can and cannot do, and that it is not possible for the U.S. to intervene in every world 
crisis.
133
  This is an important acknowledgment, as failure to realize this would result in 
repeated poor foreign policy decision-making.  Additionally, the NSS acknowledges that 
there are positives and negatives associated with both unilateral action and collective 
action.  In the executive summary, President Barack Obama wrote: “We are clear-eyed 
about the challenge of mobilizing collective action, and the shortfalls of our international 
system,”
134
 a statement that would suggest that that a balanced geopolitical approach 
would be sought by his administration.  A read of the NSS confirms that a balanced, 
comprehensive approach is what the administration seeks, but has this actually been 
realized?   
Recent flare-ups across the world would suggest otherwise.  Former Secretary of 
Defense Chuck Hagel’s remark that “the world is exploding all over,”
135
 may have been a 
bit of an exaggeration, but it does encompass the sense of tremendous insecurity and 
uncertainty that is gripping the globe today.  To be sure, every administration faces 
international dilemmas, and it is therefore not our intent to charge the current 
administration with responsibility for every crisis.  However, we find that the resurgence 
of Russian revanchism and invasion of Ukraine, an increasingly aggressive Beijing, and 
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the resurgence of Islamic terrorism in Iraq and Syria are the direct result of an 
imbalanced grand strategy that fails to fully recognize the weight of certain realities; 
namely, history and culture.     
What follows is our effort to test if conservative geopolitics can explain these 
international events of significance and if policies rooted in conservative geopolitics can 
address them in a way that upholds and protects enduring US national interests.  
Data 
1) Revanchist Reboot  
The influences on Russian President Vladimir Putin are no secret, nor are his 
personal experiences; both of which arguably dictate the course he has plotted for Russia 
in the century ahead.  Born in 1952,
 136
 he came of age during the golden era of the Soviet 
Union; an era that he has sought to restore as President.  President Putin has not 
attempted to shield his foreign policy worldview – he is an unabashed realist. One may 
also label Putin a nationalist; an accusation that wouldn’t be without merit, as he certainly 
riles up his constituents with unrelenting rhetoric indicative of a nationalist.  However, 
this would be an oversimplification, as Putin has not moved hastily to restore the territory 
associated with the USSR; instead, he has moved with a tempered aggression.  These 
calculated moves would suggest that Putin is more than simply a Russian nationalist and 
more of a revisionist who is keenly aware of key geopolitical considerations.    
As such, he is drawn to conservative geopolitics, and has given us evidence of 
this, recently stating: “After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have 
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stability.  Key international institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in 
many cases, they are sadly degrading.”
137
   
Too often however, strategists and analysts befuddle the public with intense over 
analysis, delving into the minutiae while subsequently losing sight of the big picture.  
Could the key to understanding Putin’s decision-making – and Russia’s recent expedition 
into Crimea – simply be explained by examining Russian culture, history and geography?  
Before answering this question, it is imperative that we understand why the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine is of interest to the U.S.  While one can identify a number of 
important reasons to support the Ukrainians, it is the simple fact that they are a sovereign 
nation whose people have a right to self-determination – arguably the value that 
underwrites all other American values that mandates our support.  Failure to take a strong 
stand and act with unwavering conviction would only further diminish America’s image 
as the world’s indispensable force for freedom.     
Culture 
From the perspective of culture, conservative geopolitics seems to explain 
Russian action in Crimea quite well.  Vladimir Putin has repeatedly claimed a shared 
culture when defending his decision to annex the peninsula, citing the 1.5 million 
Russians living in Crimea (out of a total population of 2.2 million),
138
 and continues to 
declare that he will defend Russians everywhere; a statement that when taken in historical 
context suggests that Putin may continue to annex territory inhabited by sizeable 
ethnically Russian populations.   
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While the annexation of Crimea is certain to alienate Europe in the short-term, the 
continent’s reliance on Russian oil and natural gas will ensure that relations stay 
relatively static – at least for the next few years.  While in the process of building more 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, Europe still lacks the capacity to import from 
North America and Asia.
139
  This is a conclusion likely reached by Putin, who sees a 
window of opportunity where he can bully Europe while still maintaining close relations.  
Beyond the next five years however, Putin will likely attempt to claim Crimea’s 
European culture for all of Russia, with the intent of aligning Russia with Europe as 
opposed to Asia; a move that would keep Russia from battling with China for Eurasian 
supremacy.  Having made vast economic and trade investments in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, China is well ahead of Russia.
140
              
History 
From the perspective of history, it is perhaps most apparent why Moscow covets 
Crimea.  With his words, Putin has demonstrated his deep belief that Crimea has always 
been a part of Russia, “It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country 
that Russia realized that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.”
141
  Clearly Putin 
maintains that Crimea is a fundamental part of the Russian state.   
A similar justification was used by Hitler when he demanded Czechoslovakia and 
later invaded France to take the oft contested Alsace-Lorraine.  Putin likely thinks that he 
too can accrue territory by taking a similar approach.  So far, a policy of appeasement has 
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been implemented by Europe, whose posture is eerily similar to its pre-World War I 
form.  The parallels are striking – following World War I, Europe was not willing to go 
to war with Hitler – today, Europe is not willing to go provoke a war with Putin and is 
tired of continuous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Like the failure of the European allies 
to rearm following World War I – which led to the Nazis conquering the entire continent 
before forces could be raised – NATO can only boast 4 members out of 28 that are 
currently meeting the 2% gross domestic product (GDP) on defense.
142
  With a military 
budget that has doubled over the past decade, and is reaching $90 billion, Europe may in 
fact be encouraging – or provoking – hostility. 
This observation has not been made by us alone, as it has been echoed by some of 
the top international relations thinkers, including Kissinger, who wrote, “Europe – who 
invented the balance of power concept, has limited its geopolitical power by self-
imposing military limits on itself,” and “Europe has little scope to respond when 
universal norms are flouted.”
143
         
Geography   
From a geographic perspective, the acquisition of Crimea is very appealing to 
Moscow.  Almost entirely surrounded by water, Crimea dominates the Black Sea and its 
possession would provide a Russian Navy in the midst of historic overhaul and 
modernization with access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Bosphorus Strait.  Access to 
the Mediterranean Sea would provide the Russian Navy with the ability to project 
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significant power over both Europe and North Africa, and would enable her to claim 
blue-water navy status.   
Perhaps of even greater importance however, would be Moscow’s ability to 
further dominate the European and Eurasian energy markets.  One of the largest oil and 
gas producers in the world, Russia accounts for 12% of the world’s oil and 20% of 
world’s natural gas.
144
  As a large producer, oil and natural gas account for an 
overwhelming majority of Russia’s exports (`70%) and about half of the country’s budget 
revenue.
145
  When one considers how one-sided Russia’s economy is – and how 
dependent it is on Europe’s energy consumption – we can begin to see that from Putin’s 
perspective, the acquisition of Crimea ensures that Russia maintains its grip on Europe.  
For Putin’s military modernization to continue, it necessary for him to leverage the 
resources at his disposal.      
2) Recension of the Middle Kingdom 
Like Moscow, Beijing has also demonstrated a measurably more aggressive 
foreign policy in recent years; particularly in regard to its territorial claims in the South 
China Sea.  While maritime disputes are not new to China, the overt interest displayed by 
Beijing in the midst of China’s historic naval buildup is a clear break from their 
traditionally more calculating and discrete nature.  The increased defense spending 
(second to only the US
146
) and military modernization that is taking place in China should 
not be underestimated, nor should it be written off as a result of the fit of nationalism that 
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is currently gripping Chinese society.  These would be gross generalizations; and the 
latter would ignore China’s cautious, pragmatic past.   
We would suggest that China’s recent aggressive nature is indicative of the 
Chinese leadership’s conclusion that there now exists a moment of opportunity by which 
they can reap reward with little involved risk.  We posit that Beijing views current 
American foreign policy as unbalanced and as largely reactive; lacking the strategic 
vision that is often featured in sound policy.  Perceiving this, China believes it can 
capitalize on dwindling US influence in the Asian-Pacific and enhance its own sphere of 
influence.  This would suggest that Chinese president Xi Jinping possess both an 
appreciation and an understanding of the various geopolitical considerations in play.  
Like his Russian counterpart, Jinping has made clear his intent to defend his 
country’s geopolitical interests, stating: “We are strongly committed to safeguarding the 
country’s sovereignty and security, and defending our territorial integrity.”
147
     
China’s quest for territory in the South China Sea infringes upon the sovereignty 
of other nations and, as a nation dedicated to individual freedom and self-determination, 
it is in America’s interest to see national sovereignty upheld.  Lastly, no other nation in 
the Asian-Pacific can come close to matching China militarily.  The US is the guarantor 
of freedom for many in the region and it is in the American interest maintain a presence 
in the region to deter further aggression.  
History 
History explains recent actions taken by the Chinese in the region quite well.  
Experts in Chinese history have determined that there is a direct correlation between 
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China’s foreign policy and its national strength.  When power has been abundant, China 
has been aggressive; when China has experienced a decline, the nation has become 
defensive and internally-focused.
148
  Yuan-kang Wang, professor at Western Michigan 
University, stated that Chinese aggressiveness is determined by “a realistic assessment 
about the balance of power,” and that when strong, China prefers to leverage military 
power against regional adversaries.
149
   
In the tradition on Zheng He, the legendary Chinese admiral who traversed much 
of the known world in the late 14
th
 and early 15
th
 centuries to trade and enlarge China’s 
influence,
150
 China is again growing its naval capabilities in order to accrue a 
preponderance of influence and resource wealth.  Realizing that no other Asian power 
can match them – and perhaps perceiving that the US lacks the political capital to raise 
support and lacks the desire to intervene – the time is right to leverage the political tools 
available and further their interests.  From a position of unmatched regional dominance, 
Beijing can flex its muscles and bully much smaller regional neighbors into submission.         
China is an ancient civilization that boasts a history of empire and like Russia, it 
is revanchist by nature.  When realizing the balance of power is in its favor, it is only 
natural that China would seek to leverage its resources to capitalize on the temporary 
window of opportunity.     
Geography 
As a regional power seeking global power status, China realizes that it must 
continue to fuel its economy, strengthen its borders/claims, and continue to grow its 
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sphere of influence.  All of these can be accomplished with the acquisition of disputed 
territory, particularly with the acquisition of Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
151
   
While the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands don’t possess much strategic value (total land 
area is 7 sq. km.
152
), the surrounding waters possess rich oil and natural gas deposits.  
These deposits are essential for continued expansion and would be far easier to extract 
than proven reserves located deep within China; as a majority of these reserve basins are 
located in the remote western provinces – a problem since most of the country’s natural 
gas infrastructure is located along the eastern coast.
153
   
Acquisition of the Spratly Islands would also provide China with access to 
abundant natural resources; however, the key draw of these islands would be their power 
projection potential.  Though much smaller than the Diaoyu/Senkakus, the Spratlys are 
located several hundred miles from the mainland and are in proximity to Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam.  Occupying the waterway between these nations, the 
militarization of the islands could provide China with a strategic forward location, which 
would allow the Chinese to project significant power over neighbors with competing 
maritime claims.  Military analysts have made this point, writing that placement of 
Chinese military assets (which are unmatched regionally) on contested islands would 
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allow Beijing to coerce “other claimants into relinquishing their claims and 
possessions.”
154
      
Of course, of all the territorial disputes maintained by China, the incorporation of 
Taiwan is still the most pressing yet also the most unlikely – for now.  Numerous 
strategists have been emphatic about the geostrategic importance of Taiwan, going so far 
as to say, “A China without Taiwan will not be able to break out of the ‘first island chain’ 
and will be denied entry into the Pacific, so much so that its southeastern territory will be 
devoid of any security.”
155
 
Fortunately, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) still lacks the 
capabilities required to take the island, and the Taiwan Relations Act still ensures 
American maritime security support for Taiwan.
156
   
Discussion 
After analyzing two international developments with national security 
implications for the U.S. – the Russian invasion of Crimea and aggressive maneuvering 
by the Chinese in the South China Sea – we have found that geopolitical theory explains 
both intent and action quite well.  By examining the basic components of geopolitical 
power with the context of the operating environment – the chief components being 
geography and history – one can make sense of actions that, without an appreciation or 
understanding of geopolitical thought seem extraordinary, random or even unexplainable.  
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While the case studies presented were both involving large, land-centric nations, 
they were chosen because they represent the most definitive geopolitical threats to the 
US.  To be sure, other nations (and even sub-state organizations with transnational 
aspirations, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)) present geopolitical threats 
to America as well; but no one comes close to matching the power wielded by China and 
Russia.  
We find that the case studies selected have demonstrated the importance of 
highlighting geopolitical considerations when crafting foreign policy.  An understanding 
of the underlying issues that drive international events can allow a nation to craft specific, 
yet strategically driven policies that pairs “means” to “ends” in a way that ensures that 
limited resources are applied effectively.  Ultimately, the implementation of a 
geopolitical foreign policy – namely a conservative geopolitical foreign policy – can 
provide the state with greater clarity because it possesses tremendous explanatory power.   
Conclusion  
In closing, I believe that the research encompassed in this paper presents a strong 
case for the absolute primacy geopolitical considerations should play in the formulation 
of foreign policy. Conservative geopolitics has proven to be extremely relevant and 
useful in our post-modern age where international, liberal institutions are increasingly 
favored and touted as the preeminent mediums for resolving disputes between states.  
While institutions associated with progressive geopolitics are certainly of use, to give 
them credence over traditional or conservative geopolitical tools would be shortsighted 




National leaders have showcased a propensity to lose sight of the utility 
geopolitical analysis can provide, and too often, instead of operating at the broad, grand 
strategy/national policy level, choose to delve into the minutiae. Working among the 
lower levels (the operational and tactical levels) of policy if fine and encouraged– so long 
as they do not infringe upon the prerogatives of those tasked with specifically overseeing 
the administration of policy at the lower levels – but it is imperative to first demonstrate a 
strong understanding of the broader framework. A failure to understand the framework 
will result in unintended actions beyond the scope of the original policy, yielding 
unintended consequences.   
It has been a mistake of previous administrations to discount the importance of 
geopolitical considerations and dismiss them as simply Cold War era considerations 
useful only for a world featuring multiple superpowers. Historian Walter Russell Mead 
recently wrote: 
Chinese, Iranian, and Russian revanchism haven’t overturned the post–Cold 
War settlement in Eurasia yet, and may never do so, but they have converted an 
uncontested status quo into a contested one. U.S. presidents no longer have a 
free hand as they seek to deepen the liberal system; they are increasingly 
concerned with shoring up its geopolitical foundations.
157
      
Mead’s synopsis makes it clear that in a world where your nation may 
have nothing but good intentions, it is still necessary to keep in mind the 
intentions and actions of other players as they exist – not simply as you wish.  
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Foreign policy formulation must account for the world and its players as they 
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In an interconnected age dominated by complex threats such as transnational 
terror, asymmetric warfare and cybercrime, it is easy for both those involved in 
international relations and the general public to underestimate and underappreciate the 
threat posed by unconventional arms; particularly, chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) weapons.  While there has been resurgent interest in chemical weapons 
following Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical munitions against anti-
government protesters and rebels in August 2013 and the reported use of chlorine gas in 
roadside bombs by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) against U.S.-backed forces 
in January 2015,
158
 these taboo weapons of twentieth-century notoriety – all of which 
were the subject of much concern during the Cold War – have arguably slipped into the 
category of general disinterest in a young century dominated by counterinsurgency and 
terrorism.  This however, is becoming particularly troublesome; especially as 
increasingly ruthless terrorist organizations and armies – such as Hamas, Hezbollah and 
ISIS in particular – acquire the resources, technological ability and state backing needed 
to develop, produce/procure and deploy CBRN weapons.  
A far cry from conventional weapons, CBRN weapons are true tools of terror.  
From the use of industrial-scale chemical warfare executed with devastating effect at the 
Second Battle of Ypres in 1915
159
 to the detonation of an atomic bomb over Hiroshima 
on August 6, 1945, these weapons have demonstrated they are capable of incapacitating, 
maiming or killing masses of people, and are indiscriminate devices of death, incapable 
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of differentiating between combatant and civilian.  For this reason, the international 
community has come together to forbid their use and has established organizations such 
as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to closely monitor stockpile reduction, 
disarmament and storage.  These organizations and similar institutions have been given 
oversight and accountability powers, and are tasked with carrying out inspections; an 
absolutely critical endeavor, particularly with the proliferation of dual-use technologies, 
which can put critical components just short of weaponization in hands of those who 
previously would never would have access. Due to the extreme hazard these weapons 
pose, defense of the American homeland from CBRN weapons certainly constitutes a top 
national interest; an observation strengthened from the geopolitical outlook argued for in 
chapter two, which called for the prioritization of inherent national interests. To be sure, 
protecting the American homeland from acts of grand terror would constitute a definitive 
national interest.  
Collectively, people throughout the world have deemed the use of CBRN 
weapons as taboo – unthinkable, off-limits and unacceptable to civil society.  Yet for the 
very reasons that the international community has discouraged the use of CBRN 
weapons, non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, find them to be rather 
appealing and often compatible with their extreme ideologies. 
As terrorist organizations continue to sweep through the Middle East and North 
Africa, destroying the helpless and displacing the inhabitants of countries from Libya to 
Pakistan, resorting to extreme barbarism to enforce their will – all while working 




we, the international community, must remain vigilant.  The aforementioned groups all 
have the avowed goal of eradicating their enemies; for Hamas and Hezbollah that is 
Israel, for, ISIS (and Boko Haram, who has sworn loyalty to the former
160
), it is all who 
do not subscribe to their brand of jihadist sharia (Islamic) law.
161
  The United States is 
certainly a target of ISIS and its allies; a fact that cannot be disputed when one considers 
that the United States is a traditional ally of Israel, is a staunch supporter of religious 
freedom, and has combat troops based in the region.  Top government officials and 
policymakers have realized this, particularly in light of the execution of U.S. journalists.  
Directly referencing the group’s sophistication, growing wealth and military power, 
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that ISIS “are a threat to everything we 
have, whether it’s in Iraq or anywhere else.”
162
   
The history of extreme violence these groups possess and their extreme goals 
suggest they may not hesitate to use unconventional weapons in order to satisfy their 
objectives.  Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), a member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, attested to the potentially catastrophic firepower such groups seek when 
referencing ISIS.  He stated that ISIS members are “rapidly developing a method of 
blowing up a major U.S. city and people just can’t believe that’s happening.”
163
  The 
growing threat that ISIS and other barbarous terrorist organizations present to definitive 
regional American national security interests and critical allies, mandates that the highest 
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levels of our government reexamine the threat their possession of CBRN weapons poses.  
The fact that ISIS has used chemical weapons and has recruited weapons experts who 
worked in Saddam Hussein’s advanced weapons programs
164
 suggests they are pursuing 
the means to craft and use CBRN weapons.  
In his address to both houses of Congress on March 3, 2015, Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu highlighted the threat that nuclear weapons in the 
possession of Iran (a state sponsor or terrorist organizations) posed not only to Israel, but 
the United States, warning: “I’ll say it one more time – the greatest danger facing our 
world is the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons.”
165
 
Keeping the Prime Minister’s warning in mind and considering the savage acts 
perpetrated by the aforementioned terrorist organizations, to include beheadings, mass 
executions, the burning of innocents, and the targeted killings of ethnic and religious 
minorities, it is clear American policymakers must thoroughly examine the threat these 
groups possess.   
The growing sophistication of various terrorist organizations, paired with extreme 
ideologies inherently opposed to American principles and social norms maintained by the 
international community, along with the proliferation of dual-use technology, suggests 
that the possibility of a CBRN terrorist attack is only going to grow. The interest 
terrorists have displayed for destructive weapons necessitates a knowledge of these 
weapons, an understanding of which types may be appealing (and available) to them, and 
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what components would be required for the implementation of a foreign policy aimed at 
severely degrading terrorist access to these weapons. 
While the threat of interstate conflict never ceases to exist, the threat pales in 
comparison to the threat violent, well-organized terrorist groups pose to the homeland. 
The U.S., while no longer the unquestioned sole hegemon, is still the world’s most 
powerful nation and no country can match its military strength. A conventional war is 
therefore unlikely in the short-term, as no state is capable of roughly matching U.S. 
military strength.  
The threat therefore lies in the growing sophistication of ideologically-driven 
terrorist organizations, which are accumulating territory, imposing strict law and utilizing 
violence enforce their law and consolidate their territory in state-like fashion.   
In order to accomplish the aforementioned objectives with the aim of providing 
realistic policy recommendations to those who participate, support, or advise in 
international relations, as well as educate the general public, this paper will set out to 
discern what the most critical component of a successful foreign policy is and what 
CBRN weapons are of special interest to terrorist organizations, focusing on those which 
are the most accessible and congruent with stated ideology and organizational missions.  
The examination of CBRN weapons will also include a close analysis of where 
vulnerable stockpiles and sources are located, which could present soft targets for 
terrorists. The goals of this paper will be to clearly articulate that CBRN terror is a grave 
threat to the U.S., that it should be a top foreign policy goal, and to ascertain what type of 






Elements of Successful US Foreign Policy 
In order to craft a foreign policy capable of severely degrading access to the 
technological components required to craft CBRN weapons, it is first necessary to 
determine what components are required for a successful foreign policy.  Previous works 
have outlined and defined core items that should be considered when crafting American 
foreign policy: how a policy can be “sold” to the public, and what inescapable realities or 
hard truths must be accounted for when formulating objectives, including the careful 
calculation of what American power can and can’t do and how long it can be sustained.  
Having examined how policy is “sold” and should be formulated, it is now time to 
examine what is needed for policy to be implemented – successfully.  
Ultimately, implementation boils down to who is assigned to carry out the task; or 
at the very least, who bears the brunt of the responsibility. While the three branches of 
American government, the executive, legislative and judicial, all have a role to play in the 
execution of foreign policy, the amount of power they wield and the role they play has 
shifted over time.  Up until the mid-twentieth century, the executive and legislative 
branches maintained relatively even shares of control over the direction of American 
foreign policy, while the judicial branch always had a minor, peripheral role to play.  The 
division of powers established within the federal government was organized in a way that 
formal foreign policy making power was split between the executive and the legislative 
branches.
166
  Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, both of whom have thoroughly examined 
the U.S.-U.K. transatlantic relationship, write that since 1945, power to formulate foreign 
policy has shifted within the bureaucracy; largely between the executive and legislative 
                                               






  The shifting  of power, they argue, is largely to be attributed to the nature of 
the president (the strength of his personality, interest and experience abroad, etc.) – since 
he has the power to command the armed forces, negotiate treaties and appoint diplomats, 
he can wield significant power – if he is assertive.
168
       
Congress maintains formidable powers, including control of the purse, the two-
thirds Senate approval for diplomatic nominees and senior executive appointments, and 
the ratification of treaties.
169
 Of the two houses of Congress, the Senate’s Foreign 
Relations Committee has long been considered the most powerful and has been utilized 
by presidents as a soundboard for advice and ideas.
170
  Lastly, the power of congressional 
oversight is another key power Congress maintains over the executive, although the 
authors argue that this power has been diminished by the growth of the national security 
state,
171
 a common conclusion that has also been made by noted historians twentieth 
century historians, including Garry Wills (Bomb Power)
172
, Stephen E. Ambrose, 
Douglas G. Brinkley (Rise to Globalism)
173
, and Christopher Andrew (For the 
President’s Eyes Only).
174
 Like the aforementioned works, a portion of Dobson and 
Marsh’s US Foreign Policy Since 1945 is dedicated to the growth of influence that the 
National Security Council (NSC) has gained in the realm of foreign policy at the expense 
of the Department of State (DOS) as well as the legislature.   
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In harmony with Wills, Ambrose, Brinkley and Andrew, Dobson and Marsh write 
that the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 was a seminal moment – not only in 
how the defense and security components of the federal government would be organized, 
but also with regard to long-term, perhaps then-unanticipated ways foreign policy power 
and influence would shift.  By creating the Department of Defense (DOD) to replace 
three independent services, the president was able to achieve unification; and the creation 
of the NSC and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) consolidated information and 
power in the hands of the nation’s chief executive.
175
 By formalizing a close-knit 
relationship with National Security Advisors (NSA) like Kennedy with McGeorge Bundy 
or with particularly powerful and influential advisors like Nixon and Ford with Henry 
Kissinger, the presidency seized foreign policy power over the later-half of the twentieth 
century.
176
            
Sometimes the executive’s seizure of power away from the legislature was less 
visible, albeit no less impactful.  Whether President Lyndon Johnson’s “Tuesday 
luncheons” where he discussed tactical and operational strategy in Vietnam
177
 – 
sometimes going as far as picking out specific targets for campaigns – or, President 
Nixon’s acceptance of Henry Kissinger as both Secretary of State and NSA,
178
 various 
actions taken by American presidents in the latter half of the twentieth century 
consolidated presidential power immensely. This accumulation of power, in conjunction 
with the growth of the security state – a combination of unpresented military power, 
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nuclear supremacy, secret intelligence agencies, and over classification of information
179
 
–  provided the president with what Wills calls a “private monopoly over nuclear 
weaponry,” leading to the creation of an “American Monarchy”;
180
 and the erosion of 
settled constitutional order.
181
 When one considers less obvious measures taken to 
weaken the constitutional balance of power envisioned by the Founders – like the 
excessive use of executive agreements – a process that has dramatically altered the treaty 
process as it was intended, presidential power has grown significantly. The ratio of 
signing executive agreements to the passing of treaties has been approximately 7:1 since 
the end of World War II,
182
 signaling an ascension of presidential power.       
Whether the president’s accrual of power was so dramatic or more of an 
evolutionary adaptation necessary for a fast-changing and complex geopolitical 
landscape, the American president established himself as the single-most important factor 
in American foreign policy formulation and implementation. 
Strategic Control (Management) 
Having established that the president is the key component in American foreign 
policy, we can then begin the work of ascertaining what quality is most useful for 
conducting and overseeing the implementation of successful foreign policy. To be sure, 
there are many traits that are desirable in national leaders: possession of sound judgment, 
ability to compromise, and a knack for managing various cabinet or ministerial 
personalities.  While all important, national-level leadership boils down to decision-
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By strategic control, we are referring to the broad executive-level managerial and 
decision-making powers the president wields, particularly as it relates to foreign policy. 
While executive-level management could be considered the same as the aforementioned 
management of various cabinet and ministerial-level personalities, we would differentiate 
the two, further specifying that the executive-level management we are concerned with 
relates only to foreign policy, and that it includes more than mere personality 
management. We would argue that at its core it consists of knowing when to exert more 
strategic control and when to delegate strategic control – and then acting upon it.  
Within the realm of foreign policy, this of course would most commonly imply 
exerting over or delegating strategic control to military leadership, which Eliot Cohen 
writes about in his chapter  “Leadership Without Genius,” in Supreme Command.
184
 He 
writes that there is a fine balance to be struck between “usurpation of strategic control” 
and micromanagement, and that American civil-military relations has declined – perhaps 
a result of senior military leaders being schooled in politics whereas senior political 
leaders are seldom schooled in military affairs.
185
  
While strategic capability has arguably been lacking in American foreign policy 
and civil-military relations generally have become strained, both in theory should be easy 
to cultivate – particularly if a president possess a strong command of strategic control.  
Military leaders are today more accessible to their civilian counterparts; they attend 
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conferences, interact candidly in interagency meetings and maintain offices within the 
bureaucracy in which they serve.
186
 Moreover, frequent and frank interaction with senior 
level military leaders should improve a president’s competency as a statesman.     
The lack of exposure to military affairs that Cohen touches on is detailed at great 
length by others, who conclude that presidential candidates often possess litt le to no 
experience in statecraft and argue that this is the most prominent component missing 
from U.S. foreign policy.       
Education (or Experience) & Misplaced Priorities  
Robert E. Hunter, Senior Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University, suggests a 
different component in Control of Foreign Policy: Management or Mishap. As the title 
would suggest, Hunter argued – like those previously discussed – that that the presidency 
is singularly foremost among other facets of government concerned with the 
implementation of foreign policy; a direct result of the passage of the National Security 
Act of 1947.  
He suggested that American foreign policy has suffered since the end of World 
War II chiefly due to a preoccupation with domestic policy and a failure to adequately 
educate presidential candidates in foreign affairs and statecraft.  
He wrote that the hasty education in foreign affairs that presidential candidates 
receive in the modern era is wholly inadequate when “world events are causing more 
problems for us than at any other time in our history…”
187
 
The author charges that the process for educating our potential presidential 
candidates needs to change, as a quick impromptu lesson is inadequate for the demands 
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of the modern era where “world events are causing more problems for us than at any 
other time in our history,”
188
 no doubt a product of globalization.   
In total, the interconnected nature of the world mandates that foreign affairs takes 
a more prominent role in presidential agenda setting and necessitates that people are 
better educated about topics of international interest. 
Interestingly, Hunter concludes his work writing “the success or failure of U.S. 
foreign policy is the responsibility of the president of the United States…the president 
must set the central vision of U.S. foreign policy, or at least be able to understand it,”
189
 
which leads us to believe that central vision precedes education in military affairs and 
experience in statecraft – as you could possess the latter but still fail in administering the 
elements of national power without the former.            
Grand Strategy & Identifying National Goals  
A third quality identified by scholars of import for executive-level leaders is the 
possession or understanding of grand strategy, defined as doctrine that informs a nation’s 
leaders what goals (interests) they should aim for and how best to utilize the various 
instruments of national power – particularly military power – in order to achieve these 
objectives.
190
 Since grand strategy pertains to national interests, the choices made by 
national leaders when executing grand strategy are momentous choices, as they affect the 
posture of the nation.
191
  
Robert J. Art, wrote that grand strategy inherently involves military power since it 
“is the most expensive and dangerous tool of statecraft,” and that it will remain important 
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for “the foreseeable future” because there is no world government to kill the existence of 
anarchy, which he defines as the absence of (world) government.
192
 Art takes a rather 
Clausewitzian view, charging that military power is the primary instrument by which a 
state can exert influence, and that politics is essentially about influence;
193
 that is, getting 
other states to do what you want. As the most expensive and dangerous instrument of 
national power, deep appreciation and knowledge of it is imperative – especially as 
international events continue to have an appreciable impact on previously insulated 
domestic considerations.     
Art wrote that military power has three political uses: deterrence, compellence 
(coercion) and defense, and that each are to be used to formulate a grand strategy that 
will secure national interests.
194
 The understanding of grand strategy that Art calls for is 
undoubtedly a critical quality to possess if one hopes to formulate a credible and 
successful foreign policy agenda, but we wonder if it takes for granted other qualities 
previously examined in this paper (strategic control/management & that the national 
executive will prioritize objectives on the national agenda). Is grand strategy as 
foundational as strategic control, experience/exposure to statecraft, or prioritization of 
national objectives?  
H.R. McMaster is yet another scholar who sees strategy as essential for success in 
international affairs. In his essay “The Uncertainties of Strategy,” McMaster wrote that 
recently there has been a tendency to overlook the interactions and intentions of foes, as 
well as other complicating factors – which has led to minimalistic and simplistic 
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assessments, and ultimately to the setting of ambiguous strategic goals.
195
 McMaster’s 
review of Lawrence Freedman’s revered work Strategy: A History, makes a very strong 
case for the absolute primacy of strategy in the administration of policy – whether it is 
military, foreign, political, or business policy. By imparting upon the reader that 
ambiguous strategy yields an undesirable – even unwinnable outcome – regardless of the 
presence of any other quality or trait, to include those previously mentioned, he makes it 
clear that the presence of sound, well-intentioned strategy needs to be placed first among 
other qualities considered “necessary” for the administration of successful policy.           
Received Knowledge 
Deep Thinkers & Architects  
The administration of a nation’s foreign policy is an awesome undertaking, and 
one that is increasingly the responsibility of the president. The works consulted and 
reviewed above attest to the fact that the executive branch has grown at the expense of 
the legislative and to a lesser extent, the judiciary. This occurrence can be explained by a 
combination of strong presidential personalities, changing threats, and globalization – the 
latter two mandating that foreign policy can no longer take a backseat to domestic 
agenda. In fact, the works consulted have determined that foreign policy has become 
increasingly more and more important, having the potential to now regularly impact 
previously insulated domestic policy.   
With the president now wielding more power over foreign policy than at any 
other time in our nation’s history, he shoulders the majority of the responsibility for the 
success or failure of it. As the most important component in U.S. foreign policy, the 
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president therefore must possess a number of specific qualities that will enable him to 
implement successful policy, including: possession of strategic control (management), 
education/experience in statecraft, and grand strategy (identification of national goals, 
and knowing how to leverage instruments of national power in order to satisfy policy 
objectives).  
Of the aforementioned qualities, it appears that the possession of an understanding 
of how to construct a grand strategy is the most fundamental, as one can possess the other 
qualities and still fail to administer any policy (foreign or domestic); as one can have the 
all the pieces to a puzzle and yet fail to fit them together in a cohesive manner if one 
lacks the framework of what exactly it is one is trying to construct. Without a perceived 
goal (end), one cannot successfully lay forth the steps (means) required to reach the 
desired outcome.      
Theory & Hypothesis  
Policy Formulation 
Having identified the primary component (president) and quality (grand strategy) 
required for a prospective foreign policy to succeed, what then would a policy aimed at 
addressing America’s top national objective look like?  
We postulate that the formula for a successful foreign policy seemingly would be 
similar to the formulation of grand strategy articulated by Art (the steps of which include: 
1) define national interests; 2) identify likely and dangerous threats to those interests; 3) 




                                               




Specifically, we would suggest that the formula for creating a successful foreign 
policy (one constructed with threat of force backing the intended objective; it is would be 
altogether unwise and unlikely a policy would be constructed without this guarantor for 
the reasons stipulated by Art (military power involves influence, which politics is chiefly 
concerned with, Clausewitz (“war is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means,”)
197
 and McMaster) aimed at addressing a national goal or objective would 
include:  
1. Identify and define the national interest. 
2. Identify and classify threats to the national interest based upon realistic threat 
assessments. 
3. Implement the qualities identified in the literature review of this paper (exercise 
strategic control, develop grand strategy, and supplement knowledge to achieve 
self-awareness).   
The National Interest     
At the outset of this paper, we suggested that the threat of a CRBN –related 
terrorist attack is among the most pressing threats facing our nation and is therefore a 
vital national interest. With the U.S. still maintaining a strong conventional force that, 
while diminished, is still unmatched in the world,
198
 the likelihood of an all-out 
conventional war with a rising power like China or Russia is low. Alternatively, violent 
Islamist extremism is surging and is metastasizing throughout the entirety of the Middle 
East and North Africa and is now threatening Europe. 
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The threat that these groups present and their quest for weapons of mass 
destruction/mass casualty have been long documented, and predate the findings of the 
9/11 Commission; findings that unfortunately only received adequate attention following 
the most catastrophic attack in history on the American homeland. In the 
recommendations section of The 9/11 Commission Report, titled “What To Do: A Global 
Strategy,” the commission participants recommend attacking terrorist organizations, 
preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and preventing and countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
199
 The participants wrote “The greatest 
danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s 
most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons,” and that in the 
ten years prior to 9/11, al Qaeda had attempted to “acquire or make” nuclear weapons.
200
    
While al Qaeda is no longer the threat it once was, as U.S. military operations 
have severely degraded the organization and executed key leadership,
201
 the group is now 
more diffuse and former affiliates such as ISIS, Boko Haram and many others are filling 
the void and are intent on propagating extremely violent acts of terror in accordance with 
their organizational missions.  
The prevention of an attack on the American homeland remains the top national 
interest. Regardless of the source, whether independent think-tank,
202
 national security 
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 or the United States Government (USG) itself, defense of the American 
homeland is the agreed top national goal and most hallowed constitutional mandate.      
Now, with both our formula and our top national objective defined, what is 
needed to implement a successful foreign policy aimed at curtailing CBRN weapon 
access to terrorist organizations? Following our formula and having identified and 
defined the national interest, what is needed next is the identification and classification of 
threats to the national interest based upon realistic threat assessments. This will include 
identification and classification of CBRN weapons, their accessibility to terrorist 
organizations, and terrorist knowledge of them (as it pertains to effectively 
detonating/deploying the weapon). 
Methodology 
Identifying Top Concerns  
As stated in the preceding section, by identifying and classifying various CBRN 
weapons that are both available to terrorists and have been pursued/deployed by terrorist 
organizations in the past, we can move one step closer to formulating a policy aimed at 
addressing the national objective of defending the American homeland from an 
asymmetric CBRN attack.    
By closely examining each category (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear), looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each device/weapon, and 
determining the: 1) general accessibility to material/weapon; 2) ease at which the 
device/weapon could be deployed; and 3) which device/weapon meshes best with the 
stated organizational goals of specific terrorist organizations posing a threat to the United 
                                               




States, we can establish which weapon-type the U.S. should be most concerned with 
being in an attack on the homeland.  
In following this methodology, we will then be set to highlight the qualities a 
president should possess to see a policy created to stop the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction/mass casualty formulated.  
Data – CBRN Analysis  
Chemical Weapons  
Extensively used during the First World War, chemical weapons came to be 
regarded as weapons of terror due to the fact that once the weaponized agent was 
dispersed it would incapacitate or kill whomever it came into contact with, often with 
little or no warning.  Chemical weapons are defined as inherently toxic substances 
created with the intent of poisoning by way of inhalation, ingestion, contact with the skin 
(dermal), or a combination of all three.
204
  The most fundamental component of a 
chemical weapon is the agent, which is chosen and weaponized for use in chemical 
warfare (CW).  Chemical agents are produced by mixing various chemical ingredients or 
precursors together based upon specific ratios.
205
  While relatively cheap to produce, 
chemical agents can prove difficult to weaponize; as they are often best dispersed in an 
aerosol form, a process that requires a high degree of technical ability in order to produce 
the optimal micron size (approximately 0.5-3 microns).
206
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Aerosolization of a chemical agent is an example of weaponization, which is one 
of seven key considerations or properties that need to be examined prior to selecting an 
agent for weaponization.  The seven key considerations are: lethality, mode of action, 
speed of action, toxicity, persistency, availability of agent/precursor, and 
weaponization.
207
  Lethality refers to the agent’s ability or likeliness to induce death once 
deployed and is a key consideration when deciding to kill rather than incapacitate.  Mode 
of action indicates how the agent enters/affects the target’s body (typically via inhalation 
or percutaneous exposure).  Speed of action simply refers to how quickly the agent’s 
symptoms begin to become manifest; usually agents are intentionally created to produce 
an immediate effect or a delayed effect.
208
  Toxicity – a property closely linked to 
lethality – is the measure of the quantity of a particular chemical substance required to 
achieve a deleterious effect.
209
  Persistency refers to the length of time that a specific 
chemical agent will remain a hazard to health after its initial release.  Chemical agents 
with a high degree of persistency are usually used as an area-denial weapon.  Persistent 
agents are typically viscous, thick and oily (in liquid form) and can contaminate a 
battlefield for a significant period of time – up to a few weeks depending on the agent.
210
  
Agent/precursor availability is rather straightforward and is quite simply the ease of 
acquisition.  This can vary tremendously, as some agents are very simple to manufacture, 
requiring only a few ingredients.  Many precursors are readily available and can be 
purchased commercially; however, there are those that are more difficult to acquire and 
whose movement/purchase is monitored.  Lastly, weaponization refers to how the agent 
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is harnessed for military application.  This usually includes delivery of the agent, which 
can be accomplished a variety of ways.  Typically however, chemical agents are 
deployed as an aerosol.                     
There are four categories of chemical agents which are generally named after how 
they affect or attack the target.  These four groups include: blood agents, blister agents, 
choking agents and nerve agents.  Blood agents poison via skin contact or inhalation and 
attack their target by blocking the transport of oxygen by red blood cells from the lungs 
to tissue throughout the body.
211
  In concentrated doses, this can cause death by 
asphyxiation.  Death occurs approximately 6-8 minutes after inhalation, although speed 
of action is contingent on time of exposure and the dose inhaled.
212
  Blood agents, while 
generally easy to produce, are very volatile – a quality that does not make them 
particularly useful for CW.
213
  However, ease of production, their relatively high degree 
of persistency, and their volatility could all be interpreted as benefits by a non-state actor 
(NSA).  Examples of blood agents include Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and Cyanogen 
chloride (CK). 
Blister agents (or vesicants) utilize chemicals to penetrate skin and tissue to 
destroy cells by reacting with proteins, enzymes and DNA.
214
  In destroying cells, blister 
agents produce severe chemical burns and large fluid-filled blisters or pustules.  While 
blister agents can be inhaled (and damage the upper respiratory system), these agents are 
most effective via skin contact, and are especially detrimental to external organs, like the 
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eyes.  Exposure to blister agents such as Sulfur mustard (HD) or Phosgene oxime (CX) – 
particularly in liquid or vapor form – can result in temporary or permanent blindness, and 
in some cases even death.  This is because vapor is an extremely efficient delivery 
mechanism; for example, exposure to less than one gram of Sulfur mustard for thirty 
minutes will likely kill an adult male.
215
  Speed of action varies greatly for vesicants, as 
symptoms pertaining to Sulfur mustard poisoning are usually delayed, not showing until 
hours after exposure.
216
  Conversely, symptoms from Phosgene oxime poisoning are 
immediate, occurring within seconds of exposure.
217
  The general traits maintained by 
blister agents – particularly their persistency, fast acting nature, and their serious and 
debilitating effect – would likely draw NSAs towards them.   
While choking agents were among the first chemical agents used in modern 
warfare,
218
 they were quickly phased out as more lethal and effective agents were 
produced and today no longer have much military application.  However, due to the fact 
that the technology and knowledge required to manufacture them has proliferated,
219
 
choking agents could be appealing to a NSA.  A few of the best known choking agents 
include chlorine (CL), phosgene (CG) and chloropicrin (PS) – all three of which saw 
extensive use in World War I.
220
  The aforementioned agents – and choking agents 
generally – affect their target primarily via the respiratory tract (though they can irritate 
the sinuses as well) and can cause pulmonary edema if the target is introduced to 
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sufficient quantities of the agent.
221
  As noted above, choking agents were quickly 
replaced by more toxic agents, and this was primarily because high levels or 
concentrations of the agent were needed to reach lethal levels.
222
      
Nerve agents are widely considered the most lethal of all chemical agents, and 
due to the complexity in both producing and weaponizing them, they are usually 
considered the premier CW agent.  Due to the technical difficulty required to produce 
them, nerve agents – particularly the more complex V-series variants – are often only 
possessed by nation-states who have the infrastructure, resources and technical ability 
needed to create them. This however, does not mean that NSAs do not have an interest in 
either acquiring them or eventually pursuing an ability to produce them, as they realize 
that nerve agents may allow them to reach their ideological goals.   
Known as “second-generation” CW agents, nerve agents such as tabun (GA), 
sarin (GB), soman (GD) and the V nerve agent (VX) disrupt nerve impulses in the human 
nervous system,
223
 which can result in death if exposed to a toxic concentration.  There 
are many modes of action for nerve agents, as they can enter the body through the eyes, 
skin or respiratory tract.
224
  Nerve agents specifically prevent the utilization of the 
enzyme cholinesterase, which is essential to full physiological function and health.
225
  
The body’s inability to utilize cholinesterase can result in loss of consciousness, 
convulsions, muscle weakness or paralysis and respiratory failure.
226
  These particularly 
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visible, violent symptoms – paired with the agent’s rather immediate speed of action – 
make nerve agents a particularly gruesome CW.        
Chemical Assessment  
From the perspective of a NSA, possession of VX would present a group seeking 
to commit an act of mass terror (and/or mass casualty) with an incredibly potent agent for 
doing so.  VX is more toxic and more persistent than the G-Series nerve agents it was 
create to replace such as GA, GB and GD.  Additionally, VX can be absorbed through the 
human body in a variety of modes; meaning that once it is delivered, it can affect the 
target population and can easily wreak havoc.  Likewise, the agent’s quick mode of 
action (several seconds to a few minutes depending on the dose delivered)
227
 would yield 
definitive results (results that terrorist groups are likely to pursue).   
The symptoms following exposure to VX would probably be appealing to a 
terrorist group, as sudden loss of consciousness, violent convulsions, muscle twitching, 
paralysis and respiratory failure would instigate panic and fear among a civilian 
population exposed to the agent (as they would likely be uninformed about CWs and 
terrified by what they were witnessing).  The selection of a nerve agent over other 
chemical agents such as blistering, blood and choking agents would also provide the NSA 
with an agent that would be incredibly difficult to initially detect – like other nerve 
agents, VX is almost impossible to detect – it is an odorless and straw-colored liquid and 
does not contain any particular characteristics that would be noticeable to most 
                                               






  This is a definitive advantage over agents such as lewisite and diphosgene 
which have noticeable scents.      
 The three significant problems that a NSA would encounter when trying to launch 
a VX plot would be acquiring the necessary precursors, weaponization and dispersion of 
the agent.  While a well-funded group may be able to overcome all three of these 
challenges, it would certainly be difficult.  The difficulty of procuring the necessary 
precursors has kept many established nation-states from developing VX in the past (likely 
meaning that an NSA would have an even harder time with acquisition).  Likewise, 
weaponization could prove difficult, as the proper micron size (approximately 3 microns) 
is absolutely necessary in order to ensure an effective weapon and can prove difficult 
without the proper technical means.  Lastly, effective CW dispersal involves 
disseminating the agent into an aerosol.  While this can be accomplished through 
technical means, the dispersed VX cloud would be highly susceptible to environmental 
conditions such as wind speed.
229
  This would mean that careful meteorological analysis 
and analytical forecasting would need to be considered pre-attack.              
Biological Weapons  
To state succinctly, biological weapons are weapons that deliberately unleash 
infectious disease with the aim of creating mass casualties.
230
  Due to their unique ability 
to infect people quickly and efficiently, biological weapons are considered to be 
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particularly dastardly.  Biological agents can be bacteria, toxins or viruses
231
 and can 
infect both humans and animals via inhalation, open wounds, and by contamination of 
food or water.
232
  Like chemical agents, biological agents are most effective when 
delivered as small particles in aerosol form (0.5-5 microns are ideal)
233
 where after they 
can be inhaled deep into the lungs.  A biological agent is considered suitable for 
biological warfare (BW) if it possess one or more of the following key features: it can 
infect in small doses, it possess survivability, it can remain potent for an extended period 
of time, it possess a short incubation period, it is resistant to accessible/common forms of 
medical treatment, and is economically feasible to manufacture.
234
 
NSAs looking to commit acts of terror are interested in biological agents because they 
typically possess a high mortality rate, can cause severe psychological and 




As stated above, biological agents are typically classified by type.  These types 
include two infectious microbial pathogens – bacteria and viruses – and a third type 
known as biological toxin.
236
  Bacterial agents include anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), 
plague (Yersinia pestis), tularemia (Francisella tularensis), and cholera.  These causative 
agents all boast medium to high lethality and incubation periods of typically only a few 
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  With the exception of Yersinia pestis, the other aforementioned bacterial agents 
do not transmit from person-to-person,
238
 which would likely be considered a suboptimal 
feature for BW.  However, due to their high lethality, these agents could be appealing to a 
terrorist organization.          
Viruses, simple infectious agents that rely on hosts to thrive and multiply, are 
very small parasites – typically under 0.3 microns in diameter.
239
  Well-known viruses 
that have been weaponized for use in BW include: smallpox (Variola major/minor) and 
the hemorrhagic fever viruses (including Ebola, Marburg, Dengue and Yellow fever).
240
  
Both Variola major and the hemorrhagic fever viruses are highly lethal, though they 
possess a longer incubation period than the bacterial agents referenced above (the 
incubation period for smallpox is approximately 12 days and the incubation period for the 
hemorrhagic fever viruses ranges anywhere from 4-21 days).
241
  One potential draw 
terrorists may find with viral agents is that they can be easily mistaken for the common 
flu – as the initial symptoms of many of these viruses include fever, headache, vomiting, 
and diarrhea.
242
  If a terrorist group were able to disperse any of these viral agents quietly 
(i.e. without use of explosives), the effects could be especially catastrophic, as many 
people would suddenly get sick without realizing how they became infected.       
Toxins are biological poisons that are produced by living organisms and, unlike 
bacteria or viruses, toxins are entirely non-living (meaning that they cannot reproduce or 
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  This quality makes toxins decidedly less deadly than bacterial or viral 
biological agents and it also makes them a much less effective BWs.  Two well-known 
toxins are botulism (Clostridium botulinum) and ricin (Ricinus communis); both of which 
are extremely potent.  Both act relatively quickly; 1-3 days for botulism and 8-24 hours 
for ricin, meaning that treatment must be rendered quickly if anyone affected is to be 
saved.
244
   
Of the biological agents we have covered here, we find Bacillus anthracis to be 
the very striking due to its extremely hardy nature (most biological pathogens are very 
delicate and incapable of surviving in a variety of conditions; however, as a bacterial 
agent, Bacillus anthracis can survive for long periods of time in a wide range of 
environments).
245
  In its dormant spore form, Bacillus anthracis can persist for decades, 
becoming active when a suitable growth environment is found.  
Aside from its incredibly persistent and survivable nature, we find that the effects 
of Bacillus anthracis following exposure would be of particular interest to NSAs and 
other groups interested in weaponizing a biological agent in order to create a mass terror 
event.  The very short incubation period for anthrax infection (1-6 days), the rather 
generic set of initial symptoms (fever, fatigue and general malaise), and the deceptive 
“improvement” of the infected individual before symptoms significantly worsen
246
 could 
cause mass terror as doctors would be in a bind to determine/identify the cause.  We 
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believe that these traits would make the Bacillus anthracis bacteria a weapon of 
potentially high interest for a NSA.          
Biological Assessment  
From the perspective of a NSA, use of Bacillus anthracis as a biological agent 
possesses many benefits to a group seeking to deploy a potentially effective weapon 
suited for mass terror (all of which would rely on careful planning on the part of the 
group).  To best explore and define these benefits or served goals, it is best to examine 
the agent’s weaponization characteristics.  First and foremost, Bacillus anthracis is 
relatively common (found in farms and textile industries),
247
 making acquisition easier 
than other biological agents, such as ricin (an agent that is much more difficult to 
weaponize).  
Examining the method of deployment, Bacillus anthracis is best delivered as a 
powder (micron size of approximately 3 microns is optimal),
248
 which would allow the 
group to capitalize on the bacteria’s hardy spore form, ensuring that the bacteria would 
survive until reaching the desired target.  Utilizing Bacillus anthracis in a powder form 
would allow the group multiple delivery options as well.  This has advantages over other 
biological agents, such as plague and tularemia, as these biological agents typically rely 
upon insect vectors (which are not as hardy/persistent as a spore).  If delivered in a spore 
form via airborne means, various meteorological and terrain conditions would have to be 
accounted for, but other more predicable modes of delivery exist (i.e. via postal service, 
balloon, etc.)  Bacillus anthracis’ highly persistent nature could also produce severe 
economic devastation if properly dispersed, as this agent could contaminate large swaths 
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of land/infrastructure for a considerable period of time.  Finally, when compared to other 
biological agents such as typhoid fever, Q-fever and tularemia, Bacillus anthracis is 
highly lethal.       
In the aftermath of 2001 Anthrax scare that shocked Washington, DC, responsible 
for killing 5 Americans and sickening 17,  biological weapons have taken somewhat of a 
backseat; especially when considering the media attention that the Iranian nuclear 
weapons program has drawn recently.  It is quite strange that biological weapons – much 
less the worst biological attack in US history
249
 –  have taken such a definitive backseat 
to other CBRN weapons, especially when one considers that there is no history of nuclear 
terrorism in the U.S.  While the media may be engrossed with the prospect of a nuclear 
attack, there are many experts who propose that the most likely CBRN-type terrorist 
attack to come to fruition would be a biological attack.  At face value, this prediction 
makes sense, as the production of biological weapons does not require the same level of 
technical ability and sophisticated infrastructure that nuclear weapons mandate.  
However, many specific biological agents do require a high degree of skill and 
knowledge to produce, meaning that their manufacture is no easy task.   
The panel of experts who contributed to The Report of the Commission on the 
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism titled World at 
Risk, wrote that their research led them to believe that a bioterror attack is more likely to 
be conducted than a nuclear terrorist attack,
250
 a conclusion drawn from a series of 
findings, the primary one being that since 9/11, governments have primarily concerned 
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themselves with the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
251
  The authors however, are careful 
to note that the threat of nuclear terrorism has not diminished; rather, that the threat of 
bioterror has risen to a comparable threat level.
252
  This suggests that dual-use 
technologies are likely to be targeted by terrorist groups, as their procurement/purchase is 
likely to draw less attention from the authorities.  The authors point this out, writing that 
as biotechnology has tremendously benefitted humanity, primarily by providing advances 
in agriculture and medicine, it has also increased the availability of pathogens and 
technologies that can be used for cruel purposes.
253
 Likewise, this conclusion is also 
telling about the terrorist’s risk/reward calculus.   
By concluding that terrorist organizations are primarily interested in biological 
and nuclear weapons, the subject matter experts (SMEs) contributing to the report are 
assuming that the terrorists are rational actors, and will only launch an attack with CBRN 
weapons if the inferred rewards (mass terror, casualties, media coverage/exposure, 
numerous goals met) outweigh the associated risks (failed/foiled plot, the aftermath does 
not draw the anticipated attention, the international community ostracizes those 
responsible).  Ultimately, the commission declared that biological and nuclear weapons 
are the greatest threat posed by unconventional, CBRN weapons, concluding that these 
weapons have “the greatest potential to kill in the most massive number…”
254
   
The authors of World at Risk surmise that nuclear or biological weapons are the 
most likely CBRN weapons to be pursued by would-be terrorists intent on launching a 
devastating attack with these taboo weapons.  Suggesting that terrorist organizations 
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planning such an attack are rational, the authors wrote that groups intent on the use of 
CBRN weapons will only deploy them if the reward outweighs the risk.  With regard to 
securing the weaponry or the hardware required to fabricate such weaponry, World at 
Risk warns that the next devastating attack featuring unconventional weapons is likely to 
originate within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan; citing 
country’s status as a relative safe haven for terrorism and the presence of unsecure 
nuclear and biological material.
255
        
Radiological Weapons  
Radiological weapons are weapons that disperse radioisotopes - unstable isotopes 
(elements containing too few or too many neutrons) that are radioactive – with the 
expressed goal of contaminating either a targeted area or populace.
256
  While not weapons 
of mass casualty, radiological weapons are appealing to terrorists because of the relative 
ease of acquisition as well as their mass disruption potential,
257
 particularly from an 
economic/financial perspective.   
Because they possess either too few or too many neutrons, radioisotopes 
inherently “decay”; a process by which they emit radiation.  There are three forms of 
decay, which include: Alpha (α), Beta (β) and Gamma (γ).  Alpha and beta radiation are 
the least concerning, as these forms of radiation have low penetrating power and can be 
blocked easily (they pose the greatest threat if/when inhaled/ingested).  Gamma radiation 
however is serious, as it possesses great penetrating power.  Therefore, radiological 
isotopes that emit gamma radiation – or a combination of all three – pose the greatest 
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danger and would likely be of the most interest to a NSA looking to commit an act of 
radiological terror.        
Like chemical and biological agents, radiological isotopes also have a series of 
characteristics that are of concern and must be considered when attempting to determine 
how a NSA may look to weaponize and deploy/disperse radiological material.  These 
characteristics include: mode of decay, half-life, availability and the actual/physical 
characteristics of the radioisotope.
258
  Mode of decay refers to what type of nuclear decay 
or radiation the radioisotope emits (alpha, beta, gamma or a combination of the three).  
Half-life refers to the time required for half of the element to decay.  Availability simply 
refers to the ease of which a specific radioisotope can be acquired – which can vary 
tremendously depending on whether or not the isotope has commercial application or 
strictly comes from a research reactor.
259
  Physical characteristics of a radiological 
isotope include its activity level, hazard to health, and any commercial/industrial 
applications it may have.
260
  By weighing these characteristics, we can examine 
radioisotopes that may be of interest to NSAs and determine which type of improvised 
radiological harm device a group may pursue.  We have examined three radioisotopes 
below, keeping the aforementioned considerations in mind.     
Cs-137 (cesium-137) is a radioisotope that can be used in a radiological device.  
While Cs-137 has a long half-life of 30 years
261
 (which resembles the amount of time 
needed for half of the element to decay) and therefore will not naturally emit as much 
radiation in large amounts as quickly as other radioisotopes of concern with shorter half-
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lives, it poses a significant threat if used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD), 
radiological emission device (RED) or radiological incendiary device (RID).  This is 
because Cs-137 emits low amounts of high-energy beta radiation, which is capable of 
harming humans through inhalation
262
, meaning that Cs-137 would be a very harmful if 
made into a powder.  In powder format, Cs-137 could be inhaled by setting of a RDD or 
an RID (the smoke and fire from an RID would be particularly devastating).  More 
importantly, Cs-137 emits high-energy gamma rays which are very penetrating and 
extremely harmful to humans.
263
  The high-energy gamma radiation contained within 
cesium-137 could be best dispersed using a RED.       
Ir-192 (iridium-192) is another radioisotope of security concern.  Comparable to 
Cs-137 in terms of relative activity (both radioisotopes have average active levels of 
natural decay or emission), Ir-192 has a half-life of 74 days.
264
  Again, similar to Cs-137, 
Ir-192 can effect humans both internally and externally (that is, through skin penetration 
or via inhalation).
265
  Ir-192 also emits high-energy beta radiation and high-energy 
gamma radiation; although it is important to note that iridium-192 emits a higher level of 
beta radiation as it decays.
266
  These traits mean that Ir-192 would likely be weaponized 
or dispersed in a fashion similar to Cs-137 (use of RDDs and RIDs to disperse the beta 
energy and use of a RED to disperse the high-energy gamma radiation to the target).  One 
important consideration to keep in mind is that Ir-192 is a solid in its natural state, unlike 
Cs-137 which is typically a powder.  Therefore, a NSA would likely want to use an 
explosive charge to break the Ir-192 into smaller particles for inhalation.   
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Co-60 (Cobalt-60) is a versatile radioisotope that has many dual-use applications.  
It is a relatively active (medium) element with a half-life of 5.3 years,
267
 meaning that it 
is rather unstable and has many potential uses pertaining to radiological terrorism.  
Emitting both high-energy beta radiation (low) and a significant amount of high-energy 
gamma radiation, Co-60 can enter the human body both internally and externally.
268
  The 
beta emissions, while possessing some penetrating ability, are most dangerous when 
inhaled.  The gamma radiation is quite penetrable, meaning that terrorists have a few 
options if looking to weaponize cobalt-60.  As a solid metal in natural form, Co-60 may 
prove hard to properly weaponize for a RDD or a RID, but it is feasible.  Use of high 
explosives or intense heat could allow for particles of Co-60 to be inhaled; however, it is 
much more likely that a terrorist organization would construct a RED if they acquired 
Co-60.  This would play to the element’s primary strength – the intense gamma radiation.  
An emission device would be most effective in using the element’s incredibly penetrating 
gamma rays.      
Nuclear Weapons   
Last of the CBRN weapons, nuclear weapons – particularly Improvised Nuclear 
Devices (IND); the type most likely to be constructed by a group intent on committing an 
act of nuclear terrorism – and the fissile material required to create them must be 
examined if we are to understand the threat of nuclear terrorism.   
Fabricating an IND, a crude nuclear bomb,
269
 will likely be the top choice of a 
terrorist group committed to nuclear terror; other options such as stealing an intact 
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weapon is very difficult, and contains many potential pitfalls.  Chief among them is 
overcoming the security guarding or protecting the weapon; because of their incredibly 
destructive nature, cost to produce/maintain, and the fact that nuclear weapons facilities 
are known targets for terrorist organizations, nuclear weapons facilities boast high levels 
of security and are difficult to breach.  The second significant problem that a terrorist 
organization would encounter following this route would be how to set the weapon off 
once acquired.  Unlike an IND that can be detonated rather simply, most military-grade 
nuclear weapons have elaborate firing mechanisms that would be difficult to override or 
actuate.  However, the single largest problem with theft of a nuclear weapon would be the 
ensuing investigation and manhunt to find those responsible for the theft.  The aftermath 
that would follow the theft of a nuclear weapon would generate an incredible amount of 
scrutiny and attention – both of which would likely preclude the terrorist organization 
from actually carrying out their planned nuclear attack. 
Therefore, constructing a simple device within the confines of the group’s 
technical ability is the most likely route – as this can be done on an unrestricted timeline, 
wither fewer resources and without generating the attention of law enforcement.  While 
perhaps a more favorable route for a terrorist organization to follow, it is by no means 
easy; as the group will have to come face-to-face with the challenge of acquiring the 
fissile material needed for their IND.   
As we have seen with other CBRN weapons, acquisition is almost always the 
single largest challenge to overcome and is an area of constant concern.  This is no 






  Whichever type of material is selected or acquired will determine what 
type of IND the group will pursue; ownership of HEU means that the group can construct 
a gun-type nuclear device – which is the most simple in design and requires the lowest 
level of technical ability to create.  Acquisition of plutonium mandates that an implosion-
type weapon be constructed (a gun-type weapon can only be made using uranium), a 
more complex design that requires greater technical ability and also a more sophisticated 
understanding of conventional explosives.   
According to conservative figures put forth by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), 25 kilograms (kg) of HEU or 8 kg of plutonium would be needed to 
manufacture a IND.
271
  The IAEA has defined HEU as uranium 235 that has been 
enriched to at least the 20% level,
272
 and this is widely considered the fissile material 
seen as most ideal by terrorist organizations worldwide.  The caveat with HEU is that 
stockpiles of this material are tightly watched; 99% of the world’s stockpile 
(approximately 1,670 metric tons) is in the possession of the nuclear weapon states
273
 – 
meaning that access is highly restricted.  Plutonium stockpiles – while still very secure – 
would probably be easier for would be terrorists to access as this type of fissile material is 
produced as a by-product in civilian nuclear reactors.
274
  These facilities are far more 
common than traditional military facilities housing HEU and while they would still have 
security considerations to overcome, they would be decidedly easier to crack than the 
security at a military nuclear weapons facility.       
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A gun-type weapon is the oldest method for creating a supercritical mass (a 
nuclear explosion) and it does so by rapidly launching one subcritical mass of uranium 
into another subcritical mass of uranium.
275
  The two masses are arranged in a barrel, 
with one mass located at the top of the barrel and another mass located at the bottom.  
The mass located at the top is fired or launched into the second mass using conventional 
explosives.  For this type of weapon, the components are relatively simple and can be 
constructed with basic equipment.    
An implosion-type weapon still classifies as a basic or crude nuclear weapon by 
design, though it is decidedly more complex than the aforementioned gun-type weapon.  
The implosion-type design is predicated on compressing the plutonium in a very rapid, 
yet precise manner.
276
  This can be difficult to accomplish for someone without great 
knowledge of explosives, as the set charges must all detonate simultaneously for the mass 
to compress at an even rate.  Failure to have the subcritical mass compress evenly can 
result in what is known as a “fizzle,” which simply means that the device will fail to 
detonate fully.
277
  A device that “fizzles” can still produce a nuclear yield, though it will 
be significantly less powerful than the anticipated blast.
278
           
A successful IND would have a yield ranging from 10-20 kilotons – close to the 
size of the explosion that took place at Nagasaki.
279
  While not as destructive as modern 
two-stage thermonuclear weapons, a blast of this size would still be devastating.  A 
device of that size could wipe out the center of a medium-sized city and would also cause 
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untold financial, economic and physiological damage.  While nuclear terrorism is not an 
impossibility, both military and civilian nuclear facilities have extremely complex 
security measures to prevent theft.  As stated above, the key roadblock preventing nuclear 
terrorism is the acquisition of fissile material.   
Radiological & Nuclear Assessment 
While all forms of CBRN terrorism are gruesome, the prospect of radiological 
and/or nuclear terrorism is arguably the most horrific – and certainly the most awesome 
in terms of total destructive power – especially when one considers the imagery and fear 
that such weapons invoke.  While many consider the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist 
attack to be infinitesimal, it is still within the realm of possibility.  This possibility if 
anything, is likely growing, especially now, in an age of where countries are racing to 
construct nuclear power plants as a way to wean themselves off traditional fossil fuels.  
Because of this international shift towards nuclear energy, nuclear fuel is now more 
accessible than ever and one can be certain that savvy terrorist networks committed to the 
use of nuclear weapons are devising plans to acquire it.     
Writing in the British Journal of Political Science, Bryan Early, Matthew 
Fuhrmann and Quan Li argued that a country’s vulnerability to NR terrorism grows as the 
size of the country’s nuclear program increases, suggesting that the presence of an 
expansive or growing nuclear infrastructure further facilitates the efforts of terrorists to 
steal nuclear and radiological material.
280
  The writers forecast that growing energy 
demand, energy shortages, and environmental stress is likely to lead to the construction 
of more civil nuclear energy programs – many of which are being constructed in the 
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  It is also important to also note however, that the authors argued that as 
nuclear infrastructure is built up, so too are the regulatory and security apparatuses aimed 
at increasing nuclear security while simultaneously decreasing the chances of NR terror 
or accident.
282
   
Furthermore, the authors stated that the likelihood of nuclear terrorism can be 
further reduced if the governing body reduces corruption.
283
  What the writers ultimately 
suggest is that nuclear programs can both influence terrorist incentive or constraint – 
depending on how proactive (or inactive) the government is at setting up a carefully 
planned, secure nuclear energy regime.    
Accessibility aside, Early, Fuhrmann and Li list a number of reasons for why NR 
terrorism is so hard to pull off.  Many of the reasons are apparent, and include items such 
as intensive planning, major financing, a high-degree of technological sophistication, and 
highly trained personnel.
284
  They also briefly browse over why a terrorist organization, 
given the proper ideology, objectives and profile, would seek to launch such an attack.  
Reasons provided include: potential to inflict more damage and disruption (when 
compared to other forms of terrorism), maximum publicity and overall “impact,” and the 
generation of widespread fear and insecurity.
285
    
Discussion 
Weapon selection and weapon appeal is dictated by a number of factors, chief 
factors being: ability, intent, goal, available components (equipment/materials), and the 
perceived risk vs. reward (desired outcome).  The importance of these factors and their 
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relative value to one another is dependent on the ideology of the terrorist group.  Terrorist 
organizations who maintain extreme ideologies – such as Hamas, Hezbollah and ISIS – 
who respectively seek to “raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine,”
286
 
destroy Israel and resist Western involvement in the Middle East,
287
 and establish a 
domineering caliphate,
288
 respectively (While Article 31 of the Hamas Charter states that 
members of Islam, Christianity and Judaism can all “coexist in safety and security,” 
Article 31 also states that “Safety and security can only prevail under the shadow of 
Islam,” and only if “members of other religions…desist from struggling against Islam 
over sovereignty” for the region),
289
 clearly possess definite, uncompromising charters; 
which suggests that an uncompromising and indiscriminate choice may be pursued.  The 
threat that these three respective organizations pose to the United States is greater than 
their harsh charters or mission statements may suggest, and all three are currently active 
and arguably putting pressure on the United States simultaneously.   
As the data section revealed, biological, nuclear or radiological terrorism is 
perhaps most appealing to terrorist organizations because of the potentially greater 
reward (desired maximum effect).  Research further suggests that organizations with an 
avowed apocalyptic or intolerant vision are likely to pursue CBRN weapons that have the 
potential to be utterly devastating; these weapons being biological and nuclear weapons, 
as they are capable of mass death and mass terror. Unsecure nuclear and biological 
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material located in corrupt regions is likely to be targeted by terrorist organizations intent 
on creating mass casualties or mass destruction.  Such groups would need to be well 
funded and would require tremendous technical ability to carry out such an attack.  The 
group would also have to subscribe to an ideology that would mandate or encourage such 
an extreme act.           
Similarly, countries possessing nuclear programs and a corrupt and/or a very 
weak governing system, possessing little by the way of civil society, are likely to be 
targeted by would-be nuclear terrorists.  While the act of nuclear terrorism would still 
prove difficult to carry out if the required material was secured, possession of such 
material could still pave the way for radiological terrorism; which is perhaps an even 
more frightening outcome, given that it is a higher probability attack as well as appealing 
to a wider spectrum of terrorists.         
The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “an unlawful use of 
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives.”
290
  I would therefore posit that an act of mass terror (not only an act of mass 
destruction) is an attempt to overwhelmingly and unconditionally coerce, force or 
otherwise intimidate an unwilling populace or government using extreme and 
unprecedented of violence.  Ultimately, an act of mass terror is just as vicious a plan to 
reroute society as an act of mass destruction.  
That being said, while the selection of a biological or radiological terror 
device/weapon certainly seems to possess the best balance of risk and reward in that the 
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lower technical threshold and modest accessibility of both would make it easier to 
build/detonate and far easier to construct and put in place without alerting the authorities, 
we believe that the U.S. government should be chiefly concerned with the prospect of a 
nuclear attack on the American homeland.   
Of the many reasons that come to mind, two appear to be the most prescient. First 
is that the detonation of a nuclear device/weapon is a surefire way to potentially release 
incredibly destructive damage on the American homeland. The U.S. and her citizens are a 
strong and resilient people, and can overcome incredible odds and dangers. America’s 
history is one of taking on and overcoming incredible challenges and outlasting 
ideologically opposed foes. However, one has to yield to the awesome destructive power 
of nuclear weapons. In a way, nuclear weapons are one of the few things that have the 
potential to damage us beyond repair and scar our society permanently.       
Second, the terrorists threating the U.S. and her allies are not only rational actors, 
they are terrorist armies that are seeking to carve out and hold real territory. In the effort 
to establish themselves as states in their own right, these far-flung, diffuse organizations 
must do what they can in an attempt to match up against the might of developed nations 
fighting them such as the U.S. and her coalition allies. These self-fashioned states will 
never be able to match the military power the U.S. commands, meaning that they will be 
forced to develop other instruments of power. The possession of a nuclear weapon – not 
even necessarily the use of a nuclear weapon – could give an organization the bargaining 







The goal of this paper has been to identify the primary component in American 
foreign policy (the president), and the qualities that are essential for the best chance of 
successfully applying (possession of strategic control, education/experience in statecraft, 
and grand strategy) a foreign policy aimed at keeping violent Islamist terrorist 
organizations intent on harming American citizens and attacking the U.S homeland from 
acquiring CBRN weapons.      
By determining that the president maintains the most power (respective to the 
other branches of government) as it pertains to foreign policy administration, we were 
then able to craft a formula by which a sustainable foreign policy could be crafted. This 
formula contained three major steps, including: 1) identify and define the national 
interest; 2) identify and classify threats to the national interest based upon realistic threat 
assessments; and 3) applying the qualities identified towards completing the policy 
implementation process. 
By arguing for the defense of the American homeland as the top national interest 
and presenting the threat of a CBRN-related terrorist attack as the top threat to that 
interest, we formed a policy for how to address the threat; starting with an evaluation of 
CBRN weapons.  
Through our threat assessment, we determined that a nuclear device/weapon in 
the hands of a terrorist organization would pose the single greatest threat to the American 
homeland. While not the easiest to procure and deploy, in the hands of a violent Islamist 
organization dedicated to an apocalyptic charter, a nuclear device would provide them 




considerable concessions. It is also important to note that while a low-probability event, 
the probability is certainly growing as nuclear energy production grows across the planet 
and dual-use technologies become more and more accessible. 
Moving forward, this research could be followed on with continued analysis of 
how a U.S. president could utilize the formula developed here and the threat analyses 
presented to actually deliver a sustainable foreign policy aimed at curtailing terrorist 
access to CBRN weapons. Building off the preceding works, this new analysis could 
include how one would introduce conservative geopolitical principles in an effort to 
establish a baseline or foundational approach to U.S. foreign policy that could be 
followed by proceeding presidents, which in theory could yield a more straightforward 
approach to the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.      
Portfolio Conclusion:  
The world we inhabit today is one of continual change and rapid development; the 
complex problems confronting one nation are continually becoming problems shared by 
many, necessitating international participation, cooperation – particularly among allies – 
and a deeper, more nuanced appreciation of the inescapable realities that policymakers 
must contend with when trying to affect change.  
The work encompassed in this portfolio has been an attempt at constructing a 
framework for how to administer or implement foreign policy – particularly U.S. foreign 
policy – moving forward into the twenty-first century.  
The three topics examined in the portfolio – the process of selling, crafting and 
developing policy – were chosen with the aim of breaking down the foreign policy 




understood. By laying out the individual components, the aim was to strip away the 
veneer in order to better examine that which is often hidden from sight or all too easily 
taken for granted – the foundation.  
We believe that the foundation of U.S. foreign policy – particularly as it pertains 
to application or implementation – has been neglected over a series of years, subjected to 
theories that were better on paper than in practice; as well as those better put into action 
by parties other than military forces.  
Frustration at home – as well as internationally – with the Global War on Terror, 
worsened by misguided and misinformed policy, a general disconnect between national 
objectives and ease of achievement at operational and tactical levels, and the cost in both 
blood and treasure led to a shift in national stance – at least by the our estimate.  
We would opine that this shift was extreme, at least in the short-term, and can be 
partially attributed to problems plaguing the implementation of U.S. foreign policy since 
the close of the Cold War. Following the Cold War, the nation experienced a period of 
relative peace, which was abruptly and tragically shattered on 9/11. With no international 
policy in place, the U.S. had to hastily prepare one. In the decade-plus that followed, the 
U.S. wasted no expense in brining those responsible for that heinous attack to justice. 
However, over the course of that decade, mission creep set in, and the scope of the 
mission was widened drastically and with few clear, truly attainable objectives for which 
the military (the primary instrument used to execute the nation’s policy) was really suited  
to pursue, copious resources were spent in an effort to offset poor strategy – all direct 




In the years following the gradual return of American forces from the theatre, the 
U.S. turned inward; with the public and many of those at the highest levels of our 
government looking for a new worthwhile initiative to pursue. While looking inward, hot 
spots erupted across the globe: the Arab Spring, the spread of ideologically-driven 
terrorism from North Africa to South East Asia, a resurgent Russia, and an aggressive 
China – all suggesting that an engaged America, guided by a well-thought out, well 
intentioned and feasible foreign policy is needed in the world.  
The research compiled in this thesis portfolio was an attempt at finding a way to 
address these issues and set the U.S. on stable footing moving forward. By examining 
how monumental policy initiatives are often sold (primarily using religion as a political 
tool), should be created (by exploring critical geopolitical considerations that should 
never be ignored) and applied (by determining the top components needed for successful 
administration), we sought to suggest how U.S. foreign policy could be better 
implemented, so that extreme swings – like the recent example in our history referenced 
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